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Thesis summary 
The Primary Education Stipend Programme (PESP) receives accolades and support 
from the government and policy partners (such as ADB, World Bank, DFID) in spite of 
deficiencies in its implementation. The general impression is that the programme is 
increasing equitable access to quality education for poor children. However, there is no 
study to understand how and to what extent PESP receiving children are benefiting and 
how it influences and affects the school.   
This study was undertaken to understand the policy gap between the introduction and 
implementation of the PESP by examining parents’ and teachers’ perceptions of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the PESP and its effects on teaching and learning, and 
school management. These perspectives provide a broader understanding of the 
effectiveness of the programme in realizing its goals.   
This study uses a qualitative case study approach and selects one rural primary school 
for in-depth investigation. Three groups of parents of children were interviewed: those 
who completed primary cycle; those who dropped out of school, and; those whose 
PESP benefits had been rescinded due to poor attendance and performance. Two parents 
were included from each group in this study. The head teacher and one assistant teacher 
are also included in this study to explore the effects of the PESP on the school-
community relationship and school management processes.  
The study found different types of deception in selecting beneficiaries. The strategy of 
not including more than one child from a single family is evident that results in many 
poor children’s exclusion from the benefit. Conditionality is used to exclude low-
performing children from the benefit which restricts access to education for a 
considerable number of poor children and many non-poor children receive the benefit. 
Thus, the PESP benefits the non-poor people. The amount of stipend money is also 
found insufficient for ensuring necessary learning materials for the poor children. Lower 
amounts due to unmet conditionality and other charges at times trigger discord and 
dispute and hamper children’s learning. The stipend money increases private investment 
in education in the form of private coaching fees.  
xii 
The PESP does not incentivize poor children to learn. In addition, it does not increase 
the teacher’s confidence of their educability or increase children’s confidence in their 
capacity to learn. Rather, a sense of the incorrigibility of poor children has been 
established and teachers allege deteriorating learning condition in crowded classrooms 
caused by the PESP. 
With regard to the parent-teacher relationship, this study finds a bitter antagonistic 
stance brew between the two groups and creates unintended effects. The teacher and the 
head teacher accuse parents of not providing adequate support at home and parents 
allege the school for not providing required care and attention for their children. This 
mutual disregard affects the teacher-student relationship and undermines poor children’s 
confidence to be educated equally with non-poor children.   
As a consequence of the conflicting perceptions of the aims and objectives of the 
programme and the perceived inadequacy of the PESP policy in society, this thesis will 
look for new insights into the process of implementation and the effectiveness of the 
PESP policy. This may encourage policy makers to reflect upon the efficacy of the 
programme as a strategy to increase access and quality education for poor children. 
1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
The role of the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programme in ensuring education for 
poor children is well accepted worldwide (Bassett, 2008; Rawlings and Rubio, 2003). The 
Primary Education Stipend Programme (PESP) is considered to be an important part of the 
broader social safety net programme aimed at very poor people in Bangladesh (WB, 2006). 
The programme itself is similar to other CCT programmes currently available in many 
other Latin American countries.  
Originally named as, the Food for Education (FFE) programme (started in 1993) the 
Primary Education Stipend Programme (PESP) was redesigned and renamed   in 2002 due 
to food distribution problems. The aim of the PESP is to increase enrolment, attendance, 
progression, and performance of primary school-aged children from poor families by 
providing cash payments to targeted households (Tietjen, 2003). The eligible 
schoolchildren are those who come from families who are, i) headed by a destitute woman, 
ii) headed by day‐labourers, iii) headed by low-income professionals (such as fishing, 
pottery, blacksmithing, weaving, and cobbling), and iv) headed by individuals owning less 
than 0.50 acres of land (marginal farmer or share‐cropper). Under this programme, a 
family with one student gets Tk. 100/month (around US$ 1.3) and a family with more than 
one student receives Tk. 125/month.   
Initially 40 percent of the poor children are selected by the school management committees 
and teachers and approval is given at sub-district (upazila) level by the upazila education 
officer. However, the government has increased the proportion of cash incentive recently 
depending upon the prevalence of poverty in different geographical locations in 
Bangladesh. The PESP incentive is provided to the poor families to send their primary-age 
children to school regularly to avoid the risk of dropout and to get better education. To 
achieve the goal of women empowerment, mothers are authorised to collect the cash from 
the school premises through the banking channel (GOB, 2013a).  The bank officers come 
2 
to the school to distribute the money quarterly. They check the papers and documents 
prepared by the teachers and ensure the money goes to the mothers by taking individual’s 
signature on three sets of documents on the spot prior to disbursement. Because of the 
conditions (85 percent monthly attendance and 40 percent marks in the examination), some 
families get a reduced amount of money as their children fail to fulfil the conditions 
properly. The programme is now completely financed by the Government of Bangladesh 
with six categories of schools being covered, namely: government primary schools, 
registered non-government primary schools1, community schools, satellite schools, NGO-
run primary schools approved by the government (excluding BRAC primary schools) and 
Ebtedayee madrassa recognized by the Government of Bangladesh (GOB, 2013a). The 
second phase of the programme started in 2008 and continued until 2013 at the cost of US$ 
36 million for 4.8 million students (Morshed, 2009:7) and currently, 7.8 million primary 
students from 62,087 rural primary schools benefit from the programme (GOB, 2013a). 
The Government of Bangladesh is spending around 20 percent of its total primary 
education budget on the PESP. 
From the start, the PESP implementation process was not transparent and fair. Several 
studies have shown that the distribution of stipends is marginally pro-poor (Tietjen, 2003; 
WB, 2006; WB 2008); nevertheless, the PESP is  welcomed and receives support from  
people from  all walks of life since there is a perception that the stipend programme 
ensures ‘access’ to education for many poor children in the country. In terms of quality 
assurance, the concept of ‘access’ has rarely been considered from the  perspective of  
assessing the impact of the PESP, but rather enrolment and attendance are taken as the key 
indicators of access. The quality of education is expressed as an attainable outcome in the 
official documents, but rarely measured as an evidence of the effect of the PESP policy in 
Bangladesh.  
Several studies suggest that the attendance rate has increased and school leavers rate 
decreased for the programme schools (Ahmed and Ninno, 2002; Wood, et al., 2002), which 
                                                           
1
In 2015, the government of Bangladesh has nationalized these registered non-government schools 
(RNGPS). 
3 
suggests that the PESP may have a positive impact on children’s initial enrolment, 
attendance, and may contribute to reducing school leaver rates.  However, evaluations also 
suggest that the programme has a leakage of over 20 percent due to the large number of 
intermediaries involved in selecting student and distributing stipend money (WB, 2006). 
Further studies point to the fact that the diverting of stipend money towards non-poor 
households appears to be widespread (Baulch, 2010; Dzhumashev et al. 2010; Hossain, 
2009a; Hossain and Zeitlyn, 2010; Tietjen, 2003) and diversion of the PESP resources 
prevalent (WB, 2006; WB 2008). This diversion of PESP money not only undermines the 
rationale of the programme to support poor families but also increases inequity in 
education by pushing those who are rejected from the benefit, out of school.    
My professional background, as an education researcher of a largest NGO in the country 
(BRAC, Bangladesh), has shaped my mindset in favour of working with the poor children 
within Bangladesh. This work ethos has created a permanent attitude towards working for 
the disadvantaged families and children to help to improve their quality of life. As an 
education researcher and professional at the BRAC Institute of Educational Development-
BRAC University, I have always dreamt of creating an equitable society by promoting 
schooling facilities for out of school children in the country. For that reason, any type of 
policy that supports bringing equity in education is of interest to me.  
However, in informal discussions during data collection for Education Watch2 studies 
(EW, 2003/4; EW, 2006; EW, 2011/12), I found that poor families were unable to retain 
PESP money for their children in spite of their efforts because of children’s failure to fulfil 
the conditions of the programme. On the other hand, in CREATE3 research in Bangladesh, 
                                                           
2 Education watch was initiated in 1998 by a group of members of civil society to regularly monitor the 
progress of basic education in Bangladesh under CAMPE, a supra-body of NGOs, working in the field of 
education. So far, Education Watch has produced a dozen reports on primary and secondary education and 
skills development in Bangladesh. I am one of the authors of the Education Watch study reports 2003/4, 2006 
and 2011/12.     
3 CREATE was a Consortium for Research on Educational Access, Transitions and Equity (CREATE) which 
operated over the period of 2006-2011 funded by DFID. The research programme assembled core partners 
from the U.K., Bangladesh, Ghana, India, and South Africa along with associates in China, Kenya, Malawi, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The partners worked collaboratively and generated unique insights into access to 
4 
I found that around 50 percent of the stipend money went to the non-poor households. This 
same study suggests that a large number of the PESP receiving children cannot complete 
the primary cycle and a significant proportion of them repeat the same grade before leaving 
school (Hossain, 2010). The study suggests that most of these repeaters, early school 
leavers, and low-achieving children come from poor families. This implies that the stipend 
programme fails to retain some poor children in the school and therefore does not provide 
them with the quality education it claims to give them. Therefore, this study will seek to 
understand:   
 why government policies fail to reach all the poor families,   
 how the PESP influences  the education of poor children,  
 how schools justify the diversion of the PESP money,   
 why parents accept the situation as it is,   
 how the stipend-receiving family uses the stipend money, and  
 how the PESP helps to create equal opportunities in the classroom teaching and 
learning process.  
The PESP wants to redress inequity in the society by ensuring poor children’s meaningful 
access and participation in education and yet meaningful access includes sustained 
participation and completion of the full cycle of primary education with a minimum level 
of achievement. However, I found most of the studies highlighted enhanced enrolment and 
reduced school leaver rates as measures of success and a few studies dealt with cycle 
completion and learning achievements as a means of evaluation of the programme 
(Ahmed, et al., 2005; Hossain, 2010). As a result, regardless of huge government spending, 
many eligible children are not getting the benefit of PESP money, as they are unable to 
                                                                                                                                                    
education situation of different countries. It uses a common framework of zones of exclusions, an expanded 
vision of access that includes meaningful learning, sustained access, and access provided equitably. The 
programme produced 75 Pathways to Access Research Monographs, lots of policy papers, books, book 
chapters, journal articles, and country analytical review reports.   
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fulfil the conditions. Thus, one third of the primary school children drop out of the system, 
around 10 percent repeat and 30 percent remain as low achievers and most of these 
children come from the poorest families (Hossain, 2010). This has led me to explore the 
stakeholders’ perceptions of how the PESP helps to ensure education for poor children and 
to what extent the goals of the programme are being met and how. The aim of the research 
thus emanates primarily from my desire to uncover ways to encourage and help poor PESP 
receiving children to complete the full cycle of primary education by removing barriers to 
the PESP and school participation. 
Thus, there are three rationales guiding the present study. Firstly, the PESP policy has been 
introduced by the government to ensure equitable access to quality education and it is 
therefore important to review and examine the strengths and weaknesses of the policy in 
achieving goals of the intervention. This research thus enables policy makers and 
implementers to reflect upon the policy level changes, based on any conclusions arising 
from the study. Secondly, there is a gap in the knowledge as to how the PESP helps the 
programme participants and how they view it as a necessity from their own perspective. 
There are a few quantitative studies showing a trend in increasing enrolment and 
decreasing school leaver rates and lower performance of the PESP participating children as 
a result of the PESP. However, a limited number of qualitative studies review and examine 
how the programme ensures poor children’s access to quality education, one of the 
important goals of the PESP using an in-depth qualitative research approach. This current 
study uses a qualitative case study approach to evaluate the programme from the 
perspective of the parents, teacher, and the head teacher of the sample school in order to 
gain new insights into the effectiveness of the PESP in ensuring equitable access to quality 
education. Thirdly, my personal desire and professional experience is another motivation 
for conducting this research. For a long time, I have been involved in the implementation 
and later evaluation of the education programme for the poor and disadvantaged children 
in Bangladesh. I organized a Non-formal Primary Education Programme (NFPE) at the 
field level and became a teacher trainer at the Training and Resource Centre (TARC) of 
BRAC. Later, I joined in the Research and Evaluation Division (RED) of BRAC and lately 
I have worked in the BIED-BRAC University as a researcher. Therefore, I have obtained 
experience of implementing an education programme for the poor children that gives me a 
6 
rich contextual knowledge of the research participants, and through teacher training, I have 
the perspective of the teachers as facilitator. All these experiences provide me with deeper 
insights into the social world where educational institutions operate and give me enough 
sensitivity to select the research issue. The present study is therefore an attempt to review 
the effectiveness of the PESP policy in ensuring quality education for the poor children 
from the programme participant’s perspectives.   
1.2 Research aim and questions    
Given the context discussed earlier, the present study has been designed to understand 
further, the parents’, teacher’s, and head teacher’s perceptions of how, and to what extent 
the PESP ensures quality education for poor children and what are the facilitating and 
restraining factors for achieving the goals of the programme. The aim of this study, 
therefore, is to explore what parents, teachers, and head teachers see as the strengths and 
weaknesses of the PESP in terms of increasing the demand for, and ensuring access to 
quality education for poor children. In doing so, this study intends to capture contextual 
knowledge of the programme participants regarding their experiences of how the stipend 
money assists – or not in bringing about changes in the lives of children. The study has two 
main research questions:  
Research Question 1: What do the parents, the teacher and the head teacher see as the 
strengths and weaknesses of the PESP in increasing demand for education? 
Research Question 2: How does the PESP influence classroom teaching-learning and 
school processes?  
Although, the PESP has a clear objective of improving achievement level of the 
programme participant children, there is no clear strategic plan for improving classroom 
teaching and learning except for setting a condition to get 40 percent marks by the PESP 
receiving children in the examination.  
To address two research questions, I have further divided these into following sub-
questions: 
7 
a. How effective is the PESP selection process and in what ways does this impact on 
the equity of access? 
b. In what ways does the school management committee participate in, and impact on 
the PESP implementation processes?  
c. In what ways do the conditions imposed by the PESP influence children’s school 
and PESP participation? 
d. How do parents use the PESP money and how effective is it in influencing 
children’s school participation?  
e. How effective is PESP in ensuring poor children’s participation in classroom 
teaching-learning process to ensure quality education for them? 
f. How does the PESP influence the school operation and management process and 
the teacher-parent relationship?  
The structuring of these questions shows my concerns about how the PESP operation 
processes are being helpful- or not in increasing demand for education and enhancing 
school participation and learning for the poor children. The knowledge gained from the 
study will lead to a better understanding of the factors affecting the effectiveness of PESP 
and therefore policy makers will be able to make more strategic, research informed policy 
decisions. Thus, this study will help in ensuring equitable access to quality education for 
all children by addressing a number of key gaps in our current knowledge.    
1.3 Brief description of overall methodology 
This study adopts a qualitative case study approach using semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews for data collection. Interviews were carried out with parents (n=6), one assistant 
teacher, and the school head teacher. Interview sessions lasted between 60 and 90 minutes 
and were all carried out in Bangla (local language), audio-recorded, and transcribed by 
myself.   A rural government primary school, implementing the PESP was selected, with 
six parents from three specific groups recruited for further purposive sampling.  The first 
group of parents had received PESP benefits for some time, but this was subsequently 
rescinded due to their children’s poor performance and attendance, although they were 
continuing their education at the primary level. The second group of parents consisted of 
those who had received the benefit before their children dropped out of the school without 
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completing primary education. All the children who were excluded from the stipend 
benefit due to drop-out or poor achievement/attendance were in third grade (8-9 years old). 
The third group of parents received stipend money throughout the primary cycle for their 
children and the children were still continuing education in the secondary school at the 
time of fieldwork (March to April 2013). In addition, the assistant teacher was selected due 
to their involvement in the stipend programme, as well as the head teacher of the school.  
1.4 Structure of the report 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. This chapter has presented an introduction to the 
study. It has provided an overview, detailed the research aims, objectives, research 
questions, and the research methodology. Chapter 2 presents the context of the study, 
which includes a brief introduction to Bangladesh, its education system, the context of 
primary education as well as the background of the PESP in Bangladesh. Chapter 3 will 
critically review the relevant literature about PESP implementation. The role of 
conditionality on children’s access and performance is discussed along with the use of the 
money in ensuring learning materials. This chapter also considers the effects of the 
programme on equity and the quality of education in Bangladesh. The influence of the 
PESP on the school operation system in general and classroom culture, in particular, are 
also outlined in this chapter. Chapter 4 presents the methodology used for the research. 
This chapter outlines the philosophical stance, the research approach, the sampling, and 
data collection process. The ethical considerations, reliability, validity, and limitations of 
the study are also discussed. Chapters 5 and 6 present and analyse findings of the research. 
Chapter 5 presents and discusses findings regarding the beneficiary selection process, the 
adequacy/inadequacy of the stipend money, the impact of conditionality, the use of stipend 
money and efficacy of the programme on access to quality education for poor children. 
Chapter 6 analyses the classroom environment, class size, learning materials, classroom 
management, and school operation in understanding the influence of the PESP on teacher-
parent relationship and learning of the children. Chapter 7 concludes the report by 
summarising the main findings of the research and offers suggestions to researchers, policy 
makers, and implementers based on these findings. My reflections of the methodology and 
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knowledge generation process are also presented in this chapter. The chapter ends by 
emphasising the contribution to new knowledge.  
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CHAPTER 2: CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the context of the study. The socio-demographic conditions, 
education system, major policies, acts, and legislation as well as equity 
interventions, adopted by the government of Bangladesh in the last decade are 
presented in this chapter to contextualize the PESP.  
2.2 Bangladesh: the context  
Bangladesh emerged in 1971 after nine months’ of bloody war against Pakistan to break 
away the economic, educational, and cultural discriminatory practices inflicted upon the 
people of what at that time was   East Pakistan. The country is situated in the delta region 
and bounded by India on the West, the North and North East and Myanmar on the 
Southeast. Bangladesh has a total land area of 147,570 sq. km and the population is 
estimated at 156 million (BBS, 2014). It is a mainly mono-linguistic country (GOB, 2003). 
Nearly, 90 percent of the population is Muslim and around 98 percent of them speak 
Bangla (GOB, 2008). Bangla is the only national official language as per the constitution.  
However, the country is made up of different groups with more than 30 different language 
communities, but with Bangla as the main language (Breton, 1997). As a consequence, 
some of the smaller language communities (e.g. Chakma, Garo, Hajong, Khashi, 
Kokborok, Kurux, Marma, Paharia, Santal, etc.) are unable to access education due to a 
lack of learning materials in their own language (Mathura, 2016). The poverty and low 
quality education along with a large illiterate population weakens national development 
and progress. The national development strategy, therefore, pays attention to education and 
literacy as a major intervention strategy to break the cycle of poverty (GOB, 2003).   
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2.3 Education system in Bangladesh  
Bangladesh has one of the largest primary education systems in the world with 6.74 
million pupils enrolled in over 80,000 primary level institutions and taught by more than 
395,000 teachers (BANBEIS, 2011). The structure of the education system in the country 
is diverse and complex. Education in Bangladesh has four major stages: pre-primary, 
primary, secondary, and higher education. The education system of Bangladesh starts with 
one year of pre-primary education offered usually by government primary schools as well 
as other private, kindergarten, and religious schools. Pre-primary education is a 1-year 
course for children aged 5-6 years.  
Primary education is a 5-year cycle. The entry age of primary school is 6 years and there 
are 13 types of formal and non-formal primary education institutions in Bangladesh (GOB, 
2012). Of the above types, the Directorate of Primary Education (DPE) manages six types 
of schools including one type of non-formal primary school and serves 83.6 percent of 
total enrolled children (GOB, 2012). In Bangladesh, primary education is compulsory and 
free for all children. 
Secondary education is a 7-year programme with three sub-stages: 3 years of junior 
secondary, 2 years of secondary, and 2 years of higher secondary. The junior secondary, 
secondary and higher secondary stages are designed for age groups 11-13, 14-15 and 16-17 
years respectively. Higher secondary education is followed by baccalaureate level 
education.   
2.4 Major policies, acts and legislations in education 
In line with the constitutional obligation and the commitments made in international 
forums to achieve the EFA goals and MDGs, the government of Bangladesh formulated a 
number of policies, strategies, and initiatives in last two decades. The following six 
legislative, policy, and actions have guided education in the country since 1990:   
1. Compulsory Primary Education Act 1990  
2. National Plan of Action (NPA) I and II for EFA goals  
3. National NFE Policy formulated in 2006 
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4. National Education Policy 2010 
5. National Skills Development Policy 2011 
6. The Sixth Five Year Plan 2011-15 
2.4.1 Compulsory primary education act, 1990 
 Prior to  the World Conference on Education for All (EFA) held in Jomtien, Thailand in 
1990, the government of Bangladesh adopted the compulsory primary education act, 1990 
(GOB, 2014a). The aim of the act was to fulfil the constitutional obligation for providing a 
free and compulsory basic education to all of its citizens and the act serves as driving force 
for legal and administrative measures to implement compulsory primary education. This 
law obligates the guardian of any child residing in an area to enrol child in a primary school in 
the vicinity of their home for the purpose of receiving primary education. No person can keep 
children engaged in such occupations as may prevent them from attending a primary education 
institute. According to the law, there must be a primary education committee for every ward of 
the union or municipal areas in order to ensure that all children in that area be enrolled and 
regularly attend the school. If any committee fails to accomplish these duties under this act 
and/or if any guardian fails three times consecutively to comply with the order, they must be fine 
of Taka 200 (around US$ 2.6) individually (GOB, 1990). The entire country was brought 
under the compulsory primary education programme in 1993 along with the Food for 
Education (FFE) programme that I shall discuss later.  
2.4.2 EFA National Plan of Action (NPA) I and II 
Prior to NPA II (GOB, 2003), the first EFA national plan of action (1992-2000) was 
prepared as a follow-up to the Jomtien WCEFA. The goal of NPA-I was to enhance 
both the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the programme to attain the EFA 
2000 targets successfully (GOB, 2003). NPA II was prepared with the aim of 
designing a programme for implementing the EFA goals specified by the Dakar 
Framework for Action adopted at the World Education Forum 2000. The overall 
goal of NPA II is to ensure that every young person and adult receives quality basic 
education and their learning needs are met in a competitive world (GOB, 2015). 
NPA II contains specific targets for EFA Goal 1, Early Childhood Care and 
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Education (ECCE, formal and non-formal); Goal 2, UPE/Basic Education; Goal 4, 
Literacy; and Goal 6, Quality Education (in part) (GOB, 2003). The guiding 
principle of the NPA-II was to formulate a basic education policy based on the 
constitutional provision of ensuring free and compulsory education to all children. 
The other principles of the NPA were to facilitate comprehensive early childhood 
care and education, making available textbooks and other education materials free 
of cost to all primary school age children. Ensuring a basic minimum level of 
competency for the children completing primary cycle, adequate budget for 
education, no corporal punishment in the school, and involving all stakeholders in 
the policy making and implementation process of education were the other guiding 
principles of NPA-II (GOB, 2003). All these principles have guided the education 
implementation strategy and results in a higher enrolment in primary education. 
2.4. 3 National non-formal education policy 
National non-formal education policy was approved officially in 2006 in Bangladesh. The 
NFE policy provides a policy framework to guide activities and priorities in non-formal 
education for large numbers of out-of-school children and youth. By defining the scope 
and vision of NFE broadly, the new policy supports an expansion of activities to be offered 
to a wider range of potential NFE groups (Ahmed 2011; GOB, 2006). The broader NFE 
programme areas include early childhood care and education for the children between ages 
of 4-8, non-formal basic education for disadvantaged children of ages 8-14, non-formal 
basic education for adolescents and adults in the 16-24 and 25+ age groups, who never 
enrolled or dropped-out of primary school, continuing education for lifelong learning and 
technical and vocational education and training through non-formal channel (GOB, 2006; 
RDRS, 2015). Based on the policy priorities, the government has undertaken a large 
national programme called Reaching Out of School Children (ROSC) in the rural and 
urban areas to enrol disadvantaged children who have never been to school and who have 
dropped-out of the primary school. From the start of the ROSC project in 2004, it has 
provided second chance primary education to over 790,000 out of school children in more 
than 23,000 learning centres through 2012 (GOB, 2014b).  The ROSC project has also 
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contributed a lot to provide a second chance for many poor children who dropped out of 
school in spite of the PESP benefit for them.  
2.4.4 National education policy 2010 
The national education policy, approved by the national parliament in December 2010, 
provides a framework for fulfilling the role of the educational system in the nation’s 
human resource development.  A key recommendation of the policy is a pre-primary 
education for all children and the extension of compulsory education to grade eight by 
2018. It also suggests a common core curriculum and minimum standards of provision for 
different types of primary and secondary level institutions to effect equity in education 
however; the plan is not implemented so far. It proposes that teachers’ recruitment, 
training, professional development and remuneration should be key elements of the 
strategy to improve the quality of education. A consolidated education law is proposed as 
the legal framework for education management in line with the purposes of the policy 
(GOB 2011a). Thus, the national education policy puts tremendous pressure on the school 
system to ensure equitable access to quality education.   
2.4.5 National skill development policy 
The national skill development policy was approved by the government in 2011. This 
policy attempts to address issues related to technical and vocational education and training 
in the country and proposes to strengthen the Bangladesh Technical Education Board 
(BTEB) as a quality assurance mechanism (GOB, 2015). The policy aims to address 
critical issues such as the provision of responsive training, quality assurance, recognition of 
prior learning and improved access for under-privileged groups in skills development 
programmes. The engagement of industry through the establishment of Industry Skills 
Councils (ISC) is a key feature of the skills policy (GOB, 2011b). To keep abreast of the 
changing demands of the society, a new National Technical and Vocational Qualification 
Framework (NTVQF) was developed in order to recognise the attainment of knowledge 
and skills through formal, non-formal, and informal education and training programmes. A 
student of general education can also receive a NTVQF qualification upon achieving the 
skills component of vocational education at secondary school level and beyond. The 
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Secondary School Certificate (SSC vocational) curriculum is a combination of general 
education and National Technical and Vocational Qualification level and students who fail 
to pass the SSC exam can attain NTVQ level 2 and 3 who passes grade nine and grade 10 
consecutively. This is a change in the assessment and certification system to allow 
Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) certificate for those who 
complete skills components of the secondary curriculum but fail to attain SSC vocational 
certificate.  This is a part of the equivalency process in general and technical and 
vocational education system to bring people under a NTVQ framework to allow them to 
further education or take vocation according to their NTVQ level. There are also two pre-
vocational levels of NTVQF to assist easy access to formal certification for poor and 
disadvantaged children who do not have adequate formal schooling but gain skills and 
knowledge from informal apprenticeship and non-formal ways. NGOs and Bureau of Non-
formal Education (BNFE) are encouraged to use standards and materials developed and 
provided by the NTVQF authority (GOB, 2011b). In this way, skills policy does 
interconnect different policy domains of education and training. This policy encourages 
many poor children to enrol and continue education at secondary level to achieve skills 
qualification for finding a job and it enhances primary level enrolment and completion rate 
as a result.  
2.4.6 The sixth five-year plan 
The sixth five-year national development plan (2011-15) is expected to be a mechanism for 
implementing the national plan and programme of the government. The five year plan 
anticipates the achievement of universal primary education, extending the primary stage to 
grade 8; elimination of illiteracy; creating a new generation skilled in and equipped with 
technical and scientific knowledge; better remuneration for teachers; and overall 
improvement of quality and equity in education. A balance between incentives to the 
private sector and instituting regulatory policies for safeguarding public interest is seen as 
a major guiding principle of the policy and institutional framework of the sixth and the 
seventh plans (GOB, 2011c).  
16 
2.5 Special interventions 
The key features of the above major policy statements focus on the achievement of EFA 
2015 goals by ensuring equitable access to quality education for all children in Bangladesh. 
It requires a different set of interventions on the part of government focussing on target 
groups who need special support in order to access quality education.  The success of such 
intended initiatives depends, along with others, upon effective monitoring and evaluation 
of the implementation process.  
The government of Bangladesh has launched various equity interventions since the 1980s. 
In the 80s and 90s, the rate of school enrolment was very low amongst the poorest families. 
At that time, around 50 percent of the total population lived below the poverty line and 
most of those families could not send their children to the school due to poverty related 
reasons. The government of Bangladesh, in collaboration with other development partners 
(WFP, World Bank, DFID, USAID, etc.) launched different interventions for enrolling 
more children from disadvantaged families in increasing equity in education. Some of 
these interventions are presented below:   
2.5.1 Food for Education (FFE) 
In the late 80s, the government of Bangladesh conducted research on the rural rationing 
system and found that 70 percent of the subsidized food grains were going to those who 
were not poor (Ahmed and Ninno, 2002). The government introduced the Food for 
Education (FFE) programme in July 1993 as an alternative and deemed it a cost-effective 
means of transferring income benefits to low-income households (Ahmed and Ninno, 
2002). The assumption was that poor children’s schooling was affected by their 
malnutrition, the direct and indirect cost of education, and a lack of parental awareness. 
The Food for Education (FFE) programme was thus introduced to achieve the twin goals of 
improving food security and school participation. The FFE programme aimed to feed 
hungry children, as the hunger itself was seen as a barrier to school participation and 
learning (Ahmed and Babu, 2007). In contrast, the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) 
programme (Ahmed and Ninno, 2002) targeted poor households with school-aged children. 
These households received food support in exchange for a commitment to send their 
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children to school. This conditional food transfer programme was a shift from general 
subsidies to a more sharply targeted programme that aimed to improve human capital 
formation (UNDP, 2009). Due to food distribution problems, the FFE programme was 
redesigned and renamed as the Primary Education Stipend Programme (PESP) in 2002. 
2.5.2 Female Secondary Stipend Programme (FSP) 
The Female Secondary Stipend Programme (FSP) was piloted in six areas of Bangladesh 
in 1982 to help increase the enrolment and retention of girls in secondary schools. The 
pilot was deemed successful and subsequently extended in 1994 as a national programme. 
The specific objectives of the FSP are to increase secondary enrolment and retention rate, 
delay marriage, control fertility, generate employment, increase empowerment, and 
improve the quality of education of girls in Bangladesh (Raynor and Wesson 2006). In the 
1990s, the focus of the FSP shifted from fertility control to improving girls’ engagement in 
income-generating activities or taking up formal employment, both of which were linked 
to poverty alleviation. This scheme provides a monthly stipend to the guardian of the 
student who maintains a minimum of 75 percent class attendance and remains unmarried 
until the SSC exams. The stipend starts at enrolment in the sixth grade and continues up to 
12-grade, subject to the conditions stipulated in the programme. The rate of the stipend 
varies from Tk. 300/year (around US$ 4) to Tk. 720/year (around US$ 9.6) based on the 
class of study. It also covers tuition costs, a yearly book allowance, and public examination 
fees. Under this programme, cash is transferred to the guardians of the beneficiary. 
(Morshed, 2009:7). One study reported that FSP has increased girls’ enrolment 
substantially (Khandker, et al. 2003). In 2005, the Bangladesh government offered free 
education for the girls up to grades 12 with additional incentives (such as book allowance, 
SSC examination fees) that in effect boosted girl’s enrolment in secondary schools from 
1.1 million in 1991 to 3.9 million in 2005 (UNICEF, 2010). 
2.5.3 School Feeding (SF) programme 
As a pilot project in 2002, the government of Bangladesh and the World Food Programme 
(WFP) launched the School Feeding (SF) programme in areas in Bangladesh with chronic 
food insecurity. The objectives of the SF programme were to contribute to increasing 
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enrolment, attendance and reduce school leaver rates in government and NGO schools 
particularly, among children from food insecure areas. The school feeding programme 
provided a mid-morning snack to all children in the intervention schools containing a 
packet of eight biscuits weighing 75 grams and providing 300 kilocalories and meeting 75 
percent of the recommended daily allowance of vitamins and minerals (Ahmed, 2004). 
Based on the pilot project, the government launched the national School Feeding 
Programme in poverty prone areas in 2011.  This donor (Australia, Japan, Spain, and 
USDA) supported programme  gets capacity building assistance from the World Food 
Programme and now serves  1.3 million children in 6,763 pre-primary and primary school 
children (WFP, 2012). This programme has increased enrolment by 16 percent and 
decreased iron deficiency (anaemia) in students by 12 percent when compared to students 
in non-assisted schools (WFP, 2012).  
2.5.4 NGO initiatives for equity 
It is useful to evaluate some of the equity interventions implemented by the NGOs to 
address the low achievement of poor children. A large number of poor children secure 
physical access to school, but many of them are unable to benefit from learning.  The 
children’s low performance is always seen as an outcome of poverty and the cause of 
continued poverty (Colclough, et al., 2000). Non-enrolment and school leavers from the 
early grades of primary school are often seen as demand side problems, as most of the 
children who are not in school, belong to the poorest families. As such, the high direct and 
opportunity costs of education act as a barrier (UNICEF, 2014). The 'opportunity' costs 
include, the ‘income forgone’ for the families as a result of sending their children to the 
school instead of sending them out to work and the real charges resulting from the 
operation of education system which do not include actual expenditures (Hallak, 1969). 
The NGO initiatives are founded on a set of assumptions that effective demand is a 
function of the effective and responsive supply of education. They, therefore, develop 
programmes considering both the demand and supply side constraints facing poor children. 
The primary education programme of BRAC is such an initiative where poor children 
enrol in the system but relinquish their PESP money (Sommers, 2013).   
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The Amader School (Our School) is a research project of Concern Worldwide dedicated to 
improving the learning achievement of the poorest and underachieving children at 150 
government primary schools. The local NGOs are involved in the process of capacity 
building of the School Management Committee of the relevant schools with Concern 
Worldwide. The Shikhon Club (Learning Club) programme of Save the Children is also 
designed to support 16,000 low performing students through its 800 Shikhon Club. The 
Shikhon Club operates out of the normal school hours and helps children to achieve grade 
wise learning competency in Bengali, Mathematics, and English (Save the Children, 2011).  
All these NGO initiatives also have contributed towards keeping school participation and 
performance relatively high amongst less well-off children.    
2.6 Primary education situation in Bangladesh 
Despite numerous initiatives, the education system of Bangladesh continues to grapple 
with some acute problems. The overall pupil-to-teacher ratio is about 47:1. Due to a lack of 
adequate teachers and classrooms, a double shift system operates in 90 percent of primary 
schools, reducing the number of contact hours between pupils and teachers. The first shift 
for grade II and I operates between 9.00 -11.30 am in the morning and grade III through V 
operates during the 12.00 to 4.00 pm slot. Official data on pupil contact hours in primary 
education place Bangladesh approximately 30 percent below the international average of 
5,367 hours and the situation is even worse in some areas and schools (Ahmed, et al., 
2005). The high school leavers rate, averaging 21.4 percent (GOB, 2014b) results partly 
from the dire poverty experienced by many families and partly from the perception of 
many poor parents and children that schooling is of little value (Ahmed, et al. 2005). The 
average attendance rates of those students who continue, remains low at 70 percent (GOB, 
2012). These social issues therefore appear to lead to the early exclusion of children from 
primary education, as they cannot deal with the lack of learning competencies required for 
their grades brought about by their irregular attendance. Many take approximately 6.3 
years to complete the 5 years’ primary education cycle in Bangladesh (GOB, 2013b). The 
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‘gross enrolment ratio’4 is found to be 108.6 percent and the ‘net enrolment rate’5 is 97.3 
percent in 2013, which appears to be successful in relation to targets (GOB, 2013b).  
However, population projections for 2012 estimated that at least, half a million less 
children enrolled in the primary school. This suggests a huge number of over aged children 
are present in the primary schools and many of these children are presumably repeating in 
the same grade. On the other hand, only one quarter of grade five learners achieved at their 
grade level in Bangla in 2013 (GOB, 2013b). This suggests a higher initial enrolment at the 
primary level and reveals high school leavers, repetition, and low achievement problems in 
the education system. Numerous articles show a disproportionate drop-out of the poor 
children from primary education before completing the primary cycle (Hossain and 
Zeitlyn, 2010; Sabates, et al., 2013). This disproportionate exclusion of poor children has 
resulted in inequity in the school system and in the society. The government of Bangladesh 
introduced the PESP to ensure poor children’s school participation by providing families 
with cash support as a condition for enrolment and regular attendance. The intention of the 
programme is to bring about change in the values and culture in present schooling practices 
and among the community. It is argued in the above discussion that the PESP has the 
objective of reducing educational inequality between rich and poor children (GOB, 2013a). 
However, a number of the studies mentioned above, indicate that poor children have higher 
exclusion rates from primary education compared to non-poor children despite the equity 
resource (PESP) allocated to them. In the literature review chapter (chapter 3), I shall 
further evaluate the evidence in terms of how PESP has contributed to bringing about 
equity in education.   
                                                           
4 Gross enrolment ratio: total enrolment in a specific level of education, regardless of age, expressed 
as a percentage of the eligible official school-age population corresponding to the same level of 
education in a given school year. 
5 Net enrolment rate: enrolment of the official age group for a given level of education expressed as a 
percentage of the corresponding population. 
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2.7 Summary   
 From the examples above, we can see how Bangladesh has launched several interventions 
and adopted policies with the purpose of increasing access to education. The compulsory 
primary education act of 1990 was the first initiative to obligate parents and community 
people to send their primary school-aged children to school. This compulsory primary 
education act provided the legal support for community participation in education and 
parents were obliged to accept the role of the state in their children’s education. The FFE 
programme was designed to transfer income benefits to low income families to feed 
hungry children and remove this particular barrier (hunger) to full school participation. 
However, the FFE programme was changed over to the PESP, due to food distribution and 
targeting problem. The female secondary stipend programme was introduced to increase 
enrolment and retention rate at the secondary level. The FSP has increased girl’s enrolment 
substantially and the school feeding programme for chronic food insecurity areas has 
contributed to increased enrolment and attendance and reduced the school leaver rates 
amongst poor children. The NGO interventions have also provided a second chance of 
education to the huge number of early school leavers and never enrolled children through 
non-formal primary education, such as BRAC, and have also addressed the low 
achievement problems of poor and disadvantaged children. On the other hand, various 
national level policies and strategies were prepared by the government as implementation 
and follow-up mechanisms to achieve EFA and MDGs and to guarantee access to quality 
education for all children.  
It is true that the enrolment figure of the country has increased significantly over the last 
two decades. However, limited work has been carried out which can further increase our 
understanding as to which of these policies have resulted in enhanced enrolment. As all 
programmes have been implemented simultaneously, the precise impact of each individual 
programme is unknown. On the other hand, the present education situation suggests that 
many poor children are not getting a good quality of education in spite of these 
interventions. Rather, the higher school leavers and repetition rates are prevalent in general 
and it is higher amongst poor children. However, a relatively limited number of studies 
have been carried out to explore the influence of the PESP in increasing access to quality 
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education. The present study aims to understand the effects of the PESP from the 
programme participants’ points of view. In the next chapter, I shall review the literature, 
relevant to the research topics and my thesis statement, to explore all these issues in detail. 
The literature review chapter will strengthen the main argument, help generating the thesis 
statement focusing on the evidence, and relating my research questions to published 
literature. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the effects of the PESP in relation to a broader literature about 
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes globally. The PESP in Bangladesh is 
similar to the CCT programme in the Latin American countries and other CCT 
programmes around the world. This literature review chapter examines topics relevant to 
the present study, including operational aspects of the PESP and the effects of the 
programme. The review provides a context of the effects of the PESP in increasing demand 
for education which usually reflects through children’s school participation in terms of 
attendance, school leavers and grade repetition, etc. This review also reports on previous 
work concerning the role of the PESP in improving the quality of education for poor 
children through enhancement of the classroom teaching and learning processes. Thus, this 
literature review ultimately provides an in-depth understanding of the PESP 
implementation processes and identifies reasons for misrecognition of some of those gaps 
and investigates the effects of the PESP on children’s learning achievements. The whole 
literature review process thus provides a rationale for the present study by illustrating the 
limited level of work in the proposed area.   
3.2 Structure of the literature review  
This literature review chapter starts with a broad theory base to look into Bourdieu’s 
distinctive sociological approach to understanding changes in the social world  followed by 
an  exploration of the general categories of CCT programme(s) worldwide and its possible 
effects on poverty, demand for education, enrolment, attendance, and targeting efficiency. 
Later, the chapter concentrates on the impacts the PESP may have on learning materials, 
the quality of education, the classroom culture, private tutoring, and equity in education. 
This review will ultimately provide a context and a basis for developing my research 
questions, taking into consideration any identified knowledge gaps.    
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3.3 Broad theory base   
I will begin with a discussion of the work of Bourdieu (1977, 1986, and 1989); mainly his 
work of habitus, social field, different forms of capital and hysteresis and explore the 
possible impacts related to the PESP. My intention is not to develop a theory rather I look 
at my work from a theoretical perspective to argue Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, social 
field, capital, and hysteresis are useful for analyzing the effects and efficiency of the PESP 
intervention. 
3.4 Bourdieu: Some Key Concepts and their Relevance to PESP 
According to Bourdieu, any type of change in practice is dependent upon the relationship 
between the individual’s disposition (habitus) and position (capital) in a social arena (field) 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1989). These habitus, field, and capital are three main 
“interlocking thinking tools” of Bourdieu (Maton, 2008).   
3.4.1 PESP and habitus 
Habitus is one of the key concepts of Bourdieu’s approach to social science knowledge. 
Habitus is defined as a property of any individual, groups, or institutions that live in and 
interact with other such agencies. This property is conceptualized as a “structured and 
structuring structure” (Maton, 2008). Habitus is structured by agent’s past and present 
circumstances, such as their educational experiences and family background for example. 
It is continuously shaped by one’s present and future conditions and practices so it is not 
static. Habitus is not random but rather it is ordered, it is a structure. This structure 
comprises a system of dispositions which generates practices, beliefs, perceptions, feelings, 
and appreciations in accordance with its own structure (Maton, 2008). According to 
Bourdieu, habitus does not act alone. In practice it is formed from a relationship between 
one’s habitus and present circumstances. It is also the relationship between the physical 
and social spaces one occupies. However, habitus is a system of durable and transposable 
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dispositions (Bourdieu, 1977). This habitus also emphasizes structure of practices, which is 
reinforced by a “generative principle6.”  
Habitus is conceived as a generative schema in which the forms of 
elemental social structures come, through the process of socialisation, to 
be embodied in individuals, with the result that people necessarily act in 
such a way that the underlying structures are reproduced and given effect 
(Nash, 1999:177)  
 Through the concept of habitus, Bourdieu provides a generative mechanism of structured 
social practice. Habitus is not static rather it contributes to the shaping of the field as a 
meaningful world (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). 
The PESP benefit receiving families and their individual members possess certain 
dispositions (habitus) and a position in the social field (capital).  The government 
introduces the PESP (a new subfield) to enable the poor families to have better dispositions 
(habitus) and position (PESP money) to send their children to school to ensure a better 
education for them and to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty. It is expected that 
the PESP receiving families show better practices regarding their child’s education and the 
children get a better education on the whole.  
However, due to the genetic mode of thought, many of the PESP receiving poor families 
remain disassociated with the school because numerous stimuli shape their beliefs, their 
outlook, and their practices which impact on children's upbringing and ultimately these 
impacts upon their educational decisions (Bourdieu, 1993). Some of these impacts are 
explored by Zeitlyn (2010) through what he terms the ‘transnational field'.     
                                                           
6 Generative principles are the principles of distinct and distinctive practices. Habitus make 
distinctions between what is good and what is bad, between what is right or what is wrong, but 
not the same for all. Like, the same behaviour or even the same good can appear distinctive to 
one person, pretentious to someone else and cheap or showy to another.  
 
26 
3.4.2 Field, capital and PESP 
According to Bourdieu, social agents are set in a game field, a battlefield, and field of 
knowledge where they use a different strategy to improve their own position in the 
competitive field (Thomson, 2008). The social field is like a football field, where players 
have set position with internal divisions and external boundaries and with preset rules and 
conditions for the game. In the battlefield, there is no level playing ground because, at the 
outset, agents who start with specific forms of capital hold better position and are able to 
‘reproduce’ more of that capital. Bourdieu (1986) designates four principal forms of capital 
available in each field: economic capital (money and assets), cultural capital (knowledge), 
social capital (valuable interpersonal relationships) and symbolic capital (prestige and 
honour) and the type and volume of capital can determine the position of a social agent in 
the field. Each field has the distinctive logic of practice and operates semi-autonomously 
(Thomson, 2008). Occupants of a particular field position know how to behave in a setting 
and this understanding partly emerges from the common parlance (truths or doxa) of the 
field (ibid.).  Doxa is a set of fundamental beliefs or opinions, accepted assumptions of an 
era which is closely linked to the field and habitus; it is pre-reflexive and inherited physical 
and relational dispositions fashioned by experiences (Deer, 2008).  Social fields are not 
fixed and a group of people can occupy multiple social fields- economic, education, arts 
bureaucratic fields at a time and Bourdieu calls it the field of power. According to 
Bourdieu, a large field can be divided into subfields and new fields can also be created. 
However, new fields may have a negative impact on the lives of the poor and immigrant 
refugee families (Bourdieu, 1984).  The PESP implementation can be taken as a sub-field 
of education field and it may have an equally adverse impact on the PESP participants due 
to the battle of transformation and preservation of the field by the dominated and dominant 
people. Here, dominated and dominant people do not represent the social and political 
class and identify; rather it indicates the categories and perception of the relations and 
disposition of the people in a specific field with existing capitals (Bourdieu, 1985).  
3.4.3 Hysteresis and PESP 
In the social conditions, reproduction of structures in habitus usually does not go well due 
to the structural lag between opportunities and dispositions to take them. Any type of field 
27 
change creates new opportunities. According to Bourdieu, the gap between the new 
opportunity and field participant’s attitude and practices result in a disproportionate 
distribution of field position in favour of players of privileged family-background 
(Bourdieu, 1977). People who are rich in economic, cultural, and social capital first 
proceed to a new position. The working classes move to the position slowly when the 
profit tends to diminish. This is the hysteresis effect or inertia in the habitus that provides 
an opportunity for those who are already successful and less successful continue to 
misrecognize the field position.  
The PESP is introduced as a state intervention to help poor people to accumulate capital 
(habitus) to get a desirable position in the field. The value of the PESP money is a 
symbolic capital to encourage changing relations between field structure and habitus; 
however, it is revealed from different studies that only some programme participants get 
benefit from this new field introduced by the government due to the hysteresis effects. One 
of the reasons being, the structures change, but the disposition (habitus) can take a longer 
time to change. Here habitus is not only considered of the poor participant families, but 
also includes the teachers and head teacher in the field of participants as implementers. 
Changes in one field can encourage change in a separate field and the hysteresis effects can 
be seen in both fields. Due to the introduction of the PESP, private tutoring increased 
substantially and the families incurred the huge amount of private cost of education 
(Ahmed, at al. 2005). Similarly, those who are rich in symbolic and economic capital also 
competing for access to the PESP benefit to winning the dominant positions in the new 
education field structures. Hysteresis provides links between nature of change (field 
transformation) and individual response to the change (altered habitus, Hardy, 2008). In 
the next section, I review relevant literature to explore the PESP implementation process, 
and the results of the programme to establish a rationale for the present research.   
3.5 Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) and PESP 
CCT programmes are acclaimed worldwide. It is considered as a good way of improving 
nutritional condition, children’s education and reducing poverty amongst the poorest 
families (Baez and Camacho, 2011; Bassett, 2008). The PESP in Bangladesh is not an 
exception and it receives accolades and support from policy makers because of the belief 
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that the PESP is bringing about equity in education by increasing enrolment amongst poor 
children. Discussion of CCT is often linked to both short-term poverty reduction 
(improvement in nutrition, health, and school participation) and long-term human capital 
development (Bassett, 2008; Ribas, et al. 2008). There is a general expectation on the part 
of policymakers that CCT programmes would break the intergenerational cycle of poverty. 
Based on these expectations/assumptions, many countries have adopted CCT programmes 
and allocated a large proportion of funding for them under education spending. This 
usually results in huge funding opportunities for CCT programmes and they assure about 8 
percent of all education spending for several CCT implementing countries e.g. Mexico, 
Columbia, and Honduras (Reimers, et al. 2006). The key debate is whether these 
interventions result in education improvement for poor children or simply increase 
enrolment and decrease school leavers. Reimers et al. (2006) in discussing Oportunidades 
(former progresa) Programme of Mexico states  
Providing financial incentives to continue in school will create pressures 
for parents and teachers to retain students in school, but does not directly 
address the conditions that undergird school failure, school leavers, and 
poor educational quality. The direct costs of providing high-quality 
reading material, classroom libraries and professional development of 
teachers focused on literacy instruction strategies are in all likelihood 
smaller than the costs of CCT programmes (Reimers et al. 2006, p.7). 
Bangladesh expends significant amounts of money for the PESP as an educational policy 
option which competes for resources with alternative options to improve educational 
opportunity (Reimers et al. 2006). Bangladesh devotes the lowest share of its GDP (2.2 
percent) in comparison with the average share of GDP devoted to education by other 
developing countries (4.5 percent) and South Asian countries (3.8 percent, Al Samarrai, 
2007b). From this allocation, in 2004/05, around 19 percent of government primary 
education spending in Bangladesh goes to the PESP (Al-Samarrai, 2008:10). It is, 
therefore, important to explore and understand how efficient this PESP in Bangladesh is in 
influencing poor children’s school participation and learning. 
The conditionality of CCT programmes is an issue. In Bangladesh, the PESP has two 
conditions. One of the conditions is related to the entitlement of the benefit and another is 
related to the continuity of the benefit. The entitlement is related to the economic condition 
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of the family, which remains more or less unchanged within a short period of time, though 
this condition is also supposed to improve over time. Improvement of family nutritional 
conditions, reduction of household poverty and inequity are the cases in point and there is 
no penalty for failure in achieving any of these goals. However, the second condition 
(continuity of PESP benefit) is related to the student’s attendance and their performance in 
the school. Breaching of these conditions results in the PESP benefits being rescinded and 
it overrides all other conditions (poverty, vulnerability, etc.). The debate is how the 
conditions of inclusion in PESP of the household (having school-age children) can be 
terminated (or denied) as a result of that child’s low performance in attendance and 
achievements where schools are, in part, responsible for maintaining those. That is why 
this study seeks to understand perceptions of the stakeholders on these issues and how 
these can affect children’s education and school operation system as a whole.   
3.5.1 Conditional cash transfer and poverty reduction: An international perspective 
Sustained access to meaningful learning is critical for long-term improvement in 
productivity, the reduction of inter-generational cycles of poverty and the improvement in 
equity situations among different groups of children (Lewin, 2007a; Lewin, 2007b). CCTs 
are found in several countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, and Turkey with the aim of encouraging parents to send their children 
to school (Attanasio, et al. 2010; Behrman, et al. 2005). CCT programmes in many 
countries are targeted at breaking the inter-generational transmission of poverty (Barrientos 
and DeJong, n.d.). Many of the Sub-Saharan African countries are also implementing 
conditional, unconditional and a mix of conditional and unconditional cash transfers 
programmes to address chronic poverty and vulnerability problem (Malmi, 2012; Scarlato 
and Agostino, 2016; World Bank, 2015). Many of these countries have successfully 
reduced levels of income inequality (Bastagli, 2010; Reimers, et al, 2006; Santos, et al. 
2009; Soares, et al, 2007; UNDP, 2009; Zepeda, 2006). However, there are few similar 
studies available in Bangladesh to understand how far the PESP has been successful in 
reducing poverty in the country and what the perceptions of the programme participants 
are in this regard.  
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3.6 PESP and demand for education 
Many of the policy makers and planners see the exclusion of poor children as a demand 
side problem and shift the responsibility to the family. However, demand for education is 
influenced by the direct and indirect costs of education which may arise both from 
household affordability as well as from the systemic problem of providing extra private 
tuition money (Laugharn, 2001). Valuing school education is another vital point which is 
related to the worth school has in children’s lives. Education Watch 2003/4 revealed that 
one out of three who completed five years of primary schooling in Bangladesh remained 
non-literate or semi-literate and a large majority of them, mostly poor and disadvantaged, 
grew up without basic skills and preparation for life (Ahmed, at al., 2005). Poor parents 
who do not see the benefit of educating their children remain skeptical of the role of 
education in changing their children’s lives. As a result, some children are excluded from 
education because of their socioeconomic background (GMR, 2009) and PESP money, in 
many cases, fails to ensure their school participation.  
3.7 PESP and targeting efficiency 
Studies show that education spending is “weakly pro-poor” in Bangladesh. Around 43.4 % 
of the enrolled children from the poorest and the second poorest quintile do not receive the 
stipend whereas 24.4 percent children from richest and second richest quintile secure the 
benefit (WB, 2008, p.19). One study identified that the absence of accountability; 
discretionary power and lack of transparency, monopoly of power and the influence of 
powerful people were the main causes of corruption in the PESP processes (UNESCO, 
2001). However, a study about politics and governance in the social sectors in Bangladesh 
suggests that misunderstanding and lack of accurate information about the programme is a 
key to misperception of corruption and its practice in Bangladesh (Hossain and Osman, 
2007).  
The targeting inefficiency of the PESP was also identified in the household income and 
expenditure survey 2005 in Bangladesh (GOB, 2005). Moreover, irrespective of eligibility, 
one study suggested that 22 percent of the student who got the PESP experienced some 
form of harassment, and of those student who faced harassment, 74.6 percent of them had 
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paid bribes for securing the PESP benefit (Dzhumashev et al. 2010). Such evidence 
indicates a weak PESP policy implementation process.  
3.8 PESP and learning materials  
Ensuring the availability of learning materials for poor children with the PESP money is 
one of the key expectations of the policy in Bangladesh since many children do not attend 
school because their families cannot afford books (notebooks, guidebooks) and other 
learning materials (Ahmed et al. 2005). This is especially the case in the rural areas, where 
many children attend school without writing materials, such as pen/pencil, notebook, and 
without reading materials including textbooks. Children without learning materials grapple 
with classroom activities and many of them are considered as low ability children by the 
teachers and parents due to their low performance in the class (Hossain, et al. 2003). One 
study revealed that the children without school bags and geometry boxes were significantly 
lower attendees, low achievers, and high grade repeaters compared to the children who had 
those resources (Hossain and Zeitlyn, 2010). One of the common understandings of the 
society is that the PESP money is given to the poor families to ensure that they provide the 
required learning materials for their children. However, studies show that the poor children 
are suffering from inadequate learning materials in spite of the PESP provision for them 
(Ahmed, et al, 2005; Hossain, 2010). It is therefore important to understand the perceptions 
of teachers and parents as to how the PESP money ensures learning materials and class 
participation of poor children.  
On the other hand, the government of Bangladesh has introduced English as a compulsory 
part of the first grade curriculum of primary education in order to increase the number of 
people able to communicate in English to levels that enable them to participate fully in 
economic and social activities and opportunities (English in Action, 2009). However, there 
is an issue of unburdening children from the second language from the first grade since 
most of the parents of poor children are illiterate and cannot help them at home. However, 
well-off people want their children to become competent in English in order to pursue 
higher education, get good grades, good jobs, and communicate well in English. As a 
result, English is now a compulsory subject from grade one. However, one study reported 
that 81 percent of the teachers do not know the aims and objectives of teaching English at 
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primary level and 79 percent teachers have no training to teach English at primary level 
(Hossain, at al. 2015). This inadequate English teaching in the school promotes private 
tutoring and poor families need to rely partially on the PESP money to pay the fees for this 
because they cannot provide the required support at home. It is therefore important to 
know how parents use the PESP money and what their perceptions are in this regard.   
3.9 Enrolment, attendance, and PESP  
From the start of the FFE and redesigned PESP, some studies have been undertaken in 
Bangladesh which examined the effect of these programmes through gross and net 
enrolment and school attendance rates (Ahmed, 2004; Ahmed and Babu, 2007; Ahmed and 
Arends-Kuenning, 2003; Arends-Kuenning, and Amin, 2004; Baulch, 2010; GOB, 2011; 
GOB, 2013a; Hossain, 2009).  A study on the food for education programme shows that 
the attendance rate of the programme school was 10 percentage points higher than a non- 
programme school and the school leaver rate is 9 percentage points lower for the 
programme schools (Ahmed and Ninno, 2002). IFPRI documented an increase in 
enrolment rate of 38.1 percent and attendance from 63.0 percent to 77.6 percent (Wood, et 
al. 2002). It also showed a reduction in the school leaver rate from 18.5 percent to 10.9 
percent. A study carried out in Mexico, highlighted an increase in secondary school 
enrolment from 70 to 78 percent between the year 1998 and 2000 due to the CCT 
programme (Skoufias and Quisumbing, 2005). The same study showed a comparative 
higher attendance rate in school offering Food for Education (FFE) programme in 
Bangladesh (70 percent as compared to school not offering FFE 58 percent). These studies 
indicate that the PESP has a significantly positive impact on children’s initial enrolment 
and attendance and encourages poor families to send their children to the school. However, 
these studies cannot inform how the poor children are performing in the school.   
3.10 PESP and quality education 
The impact of cash transfer programmes globally appears to be negative in terms of 
educational attainment. The 'Progresa' programme of the Mexican government was aimed 
at developing the human capital of poor households. The programme covered 2.6 million 
rural families in 1999 in its multi-sectoral package of education, nutrition, and health 
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services by providing a cash transfer to households (Schultz, 2001). One study showed that 
after almost a school year and a half of exposure to 'Progresa', there was no significant 
positive impact on the test scores for achievement, in the treatment group of children 
(Behrman, et al. 2000). It seemed that the impact of 'Progresa' on developing human 
capital, one of the major objectives of CCT, was inconclusive (UNDP, 2009). While the 
results of Bolsa Familia programme of Brazil indicated beneficiary children’s almost four 
percentage points more likelihood than non-beneficiaries fail at school; however the study 
did not explore the reasons for programme participant children’s higher failure rates 
(Soares, et al, 2007). 
The PESP is intended to improve the quality of education in Bangladesh (GOB, 2011c). 
However, an IFPRI study on the medium-term impact of the PESP revealed a marginally 
significant (p=0.09) impact on grade progression; paradoxically lower among PESP 
beneficiaries compared to non-PESP beneficiaries in Bangladesh (Baulch, 2010: 18). 
Similarly, a study on school feeding programmes in Bangladesh revealed no effect on 
school cycle completion and transition to secondary school, as well as decreasing school 
leaver rates in the higher grades of primary school (Downen, et al. 2011). However, there 
are few studies that assess the direct effect of the PESP on learning achievement of the 
programme participant children, except for few examples of other equity interventions in 
Bangladesh (Ahmed and Arends-Kuenning, 2003; Assadulla et al. 2006, Schurmann, 
2009). These results above indicate that many of the equity interventions have increased 
enrolment and decreased school leaver rates, but have not increased learning achievement 
of the programme participant children. Bangladesh is not an exception in this regard. 
Increased enrolment is not a strong indicator of the effectiveness of the PESP for 
improving human capital (Filmer and Schady, 2010; USAID, 2008). The PESP has 
changed the attitude of the families towards sending their children to the school, but it is 
not explored how much improvement the PESP has wrought on classroom teaching and 
learning process to enhance student’s learning in general and girl’s education in particular 
(Kane, 2004).  
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3.11 PESP and classroom culture 
What effect the PESP has on classroom teaching and learning processes and how first 
generation learners are being treated and adjusted in the school is an under-researched area 
in Bangladesh. CCT in Colombia increases the number of children in the school, but it also 
causes exclusion of poor children by completely swamping supply and overcrowding the 
classrooms (Baez and Camacho, 2011; Berg, 2008). It is usually alleged by the teachers 
that they cannot manage and ensure learning for all children of a large class due to time 
constraints and it is found that the poor and first generation learners who have no one else 
to help at home usually lag behind in spite of the PESP benefit for them. It supports the 
theory that lack of quality education fails to ensure EFA goals because poor children suffer 
most when “quality of education is weak” (Berg, 2008). However, relatively little is known 
about the common concerns of the teachers and parents, a gap which this study addresses. 
Ngware et al. (2013) noted that poor children usually sat in the rear benches which meant 
they received less attention from the teacher and subsequently performed badly. A study by 
Cox et al. (2012) offered support for this by highlighting a marginal improvement in 
overall course performance of low-performing students who sit in the front bench. In 
Bangladesh, there is no study showing parent and teacher’s reaction and expectation of the 
classroom organisation and role of the PESP money on the situation.  
3.12 School violence and the PESP 
The issue of violence against children in schools should be examined from a 
broader socio-cultural context that construct social norms, hierarchy, discipline, and 
agreement among the people (Antonowicz, 2010; Harber, 2004). Violence against 
children arises out of a complex socio-political and economic environment of a 
community and is reproduced in the school system (Antonowicz, 2010). School 
violence has a causal relationship with corporal punishment. The use of physical 
punishment increases the probability of violence in schools (Straus, 1991). 
However, I shall focus my discussion more on the corporal punishment in primary 
and secondary education system in Bangladesh rather than school violence as a 
whole.  
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The corporal punishment is normally accepted as a disciplining device and schools 
have been practising it with impunity. A study shows a declining trend of corporal 
punishment in Bangladesh from 79 percent in 2013 to 53 percent in 2015 (CAMPE, 
2015). However, the same study shows the acceptability of physical punishment is 
still high at 95 percent in 2015 among the parent groups (CAMPE, 2015). In slum 
areas in Dhaka city, corporal punishment is widely practised in public schools and  
victimised students feel ‘mentally bad’ along with physical pain as other children 
poke fun at them (UNICEF, 2001). Bangladesh Legal Aid (2012) shows that 77.1 
percent of students are punished either physically or psychologically or financially 
in their schools, while 34.9 percent teachers agree it happen in their school. A study 
shows around 91 percent of children in school experience physical punishment and 
poorer children face greater frequency and severity of corporal punishment than rich 
children (UNICEF, 2015).  
Corporal punishment is unlawful in schools in Bangladesh according to a Supreme 
Court ruling. Nevertheless, corporal punishment in schools is still a serious issue in 
Bangladesh. There are various reasons for physical punishment in primary and 
secondary schools. First of all, teachers believe corporal punishment is an effective 
way of classroom management. Secondly, the persistence of school authoritarianism 
inflicts corporal punishment (Harber and Mncube, 2012). Thirdly, sometimes 
teachers use this strategy to prevent to be questioned in the classroom or sometimes 
to mask their own knowledge gaps to students. Fourthly, teachers use corporal 
punishment as a motivational tool to increase students’ study time at home. Fifthly, 
when teachers become impatient of the unruly behaviour of students, they resort to 
punishment to establish order in the classroom. Sixthly, some teachers are alleged to 
punish the students who refuse to receive private tutoring from them (Ahmed, et al. 
2005). Seventhly, the level of violence in the home and the community also affects 
school-based violence and aggressive behaviour prevalent outside school is 
replicated inside school (Antonowicz, 2010). Eighthly, prevalence of corporal 
punishment happens due to systemic causes and deficiencies in the school system. 
Finally, a lack of knowledge about non-violent forms of discipline affects classroom 
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management capacity of teachers and results in school violence (Antonowicz, 
2010).   
Violence in school is dependent not only on the socio-economic context in which 
schools operate but is also linked to socio-cultural traditions and the strength and 
weakness of education systems (Antonowicz, 2010). Worldwide, corporal 
punishment in schools is unlawful in 117 states (UNICEF, 2011). However, almost 
universally, corporal punishment is accepted socially and culturally as a means of 
disciplining children at home and in the school settings (Naz, et al. 2011). Corporal 
punishment in schools is usually administered in the ‘best interest’ of children to 
induce ‘good behaviour’ in the classroom (Arif and Rafi, 2007).  Students who are 
physically punished acquire negative attitudes towards learning and many of them 
learn aggression and lack empathy in their later lives (Mncube and Harber, 2013). 
These students develop low self-esteem and are hesitant to take part in learning. 
Corporal punishment instils conviction into students that force is justified to control 
unwanted behaviour and so it should not be used to maintain discipline (Ahmad et 
al. 2013). Many students in Pakistan fear attending school and many of those who 
seek admission later leave the school due to physical punishment (Arif and Rafi, 
2007).     
On the other hand, the social transformative role of education is appreciated by all. 
However, the open competition, achievement, and merit-based education system 
virtually reproduces and perpetuates inequalities in society (Harber, 2004; Harber 
and Sakade, 2009). In Mexico, men applied violence against women to reassert 
traditional control over women who became the primary breadwinner due to the 
conditional cash transfer programme (Heise, 2011). Perhaps, the PESP in 
Bangladesh puts those children who usually fail to meet the conditionality of the 
programme at higher risk of school violence. However, there is no study to examine 
the issue.     
 
 
37 
3.13 Private tutoring and the PESP  
Private tutoring is now an established system in Bangladesh. Around 88 percent of 
government secondary school students and 43 percent of the government primary school 
students are found to receive private tutoring (Ahmed, et al. 2007). The average 
expenditure on private tuition by a student is 9.2 times the total tuition and other fees in the 
case of government schools and 3.1 times in the case of non-government secondary 
schools (Ahmed, et al. 2007). It is a common understanding among the teachers that the 
PESP money is given to the poor families to spend on private tutoring since non-literate 
parents cannot support their children at home. Some families who cannot afford to tutor 
throughout the year hire private tutors during particular critical times such as before annual 
examinations (Amin and Chandrasekhar, 2009). The achievement of learners without 
private tutors is poor. A study in Bangladesh shows that private tutoring plays a significant 
role in achieving basic education criteria for nearly a half of the children compared to 27.5 
percent children those who did not (Chowdhury et al. 1999). An Education Watch (2007) 
study showed a 29 percent pass rate among children who had a private tutor against 15.6 
percent amongst those who had not (Nath et al. 2008). Highly educated individuals obtain 
a better job as a result of the university degree and better English language proficiency. 
Families, therefore, invest more on education in the form of private tutoring to supplement 
courses in formal education to prepare their children using education as the gateway to 
well-paid services. The PESP money is seen as an opportunity for the poor families spend 
on private tutoring. However, in many cases, private tutoring can result in some form of 
retribution, with children being brushed-aside or given poor grades, who are not involved 
in coaching with the school teachers (Tietjen, 2003). This increasing private expenditure 
reduces government investment in education and deteriorates the quality of education 
(Bray, 2007). All these findings support the importance of an increased understanding of 
how parents see the role of the PESP money in increasing their ability to spend and what 
teachers consider the contribution of the PESP money in the increasing quality education 
of poor children. 
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3.14 Poverty, low achievement and PESP   
Due to the socioeconomic background and inadequate support of the schools, certain 
groups of children are excluded from the school (Cohen and Bloom, 2005; Fahmi, 2007; 
GMR, 2010; Haugen, 2011; Pigozzi, 2004).  The impact of poverty on low educational 
achievement is well documented globally (GMR, 2005). Poverty significantly affects both 
educational investments and the learning of children in rural China (Park and Brown, 
2002). In Bangladesh, many studies have found a positive correlation between poverty and 
exclusion from education (Ahmed et al. 2005; Hossain and Zeitlyn, 2010). In most cases, 
parents of these low performing children are illiterate and the poverty cycle continues for 
them for generations.  
It is also found that where most children are poor and attend a poor quality school, they are 
disadvantaged compared to poor children who attend rich schools (Willms, 2006). 
Children in absolute poverty face an uncongenial learning environment at home, including 
a poor physical and learning environment, excessive work, and an absence of books. These 
adverse home environments reduce motivation to learn for these children. Not only in 
developing countries, but also in children from marginalized families of developed 
countries have lower levels of motivation for learning in the school due to their 
psychological alienation from the mainstream society (Berg, 2008). How lower educational 
achievement of the poor children affects the PESP benefit is an important issue to 
investigate.  
3.15 PESP and equity in education  
A World Bank report revealed that the impact of PESP on inequality in access between 
poor and non-poor children had not declined significantly between 2000- 2005 in 
Bangladesh (Al-Samarrai, 2007a). Equity in education is an attitude and commitment 
towards providing adequate resources and support services for disadvantaged learner 
groups. Equity is more than equality, which is ingrained in humanity and arisen from the 
'fair play and compassion' (Arnold, 2005; NREL, 1997). The value of educational equity is 
more philosophical rather than legal and it should be considered from three different 
dimensions; equity in resources, equity in processes, and equity of outcomes (Arnold, 
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2005). This broader concept of educational equity establishes social justice and enhances 
the progress of the country as a whole when benefits of learning are widely shared and the 
gaps are minimised between the most and the least advantaged (Levin, 2003). At the 
school level, there are many activities to undertake to ensure equity in education. In many 
cases, the inequity problems increase since school participation can depend on a citizen’s 
wealth (Sayed, 2008). Therefore, equity-based targets should be followed instead of 
national average targets to assure the development of competent human resources and 
lessen social costs (GMR, 2005, GMR, 2010, Norton, et al. 2005).  It means that raising 
performance levels depends critically on the capacity of an education system to address the 
needs of poorly performing students and schools (Schleicher, 2009). How the PESP 
programme has been supportive to the process of equitable human resource development, 
creating equal opportunity in the classroom teaching and learning process, is, therefore, an 
important question to explore. Equity in education can also be seen from two different 
dimensions, fairness and inclusion, which are closely intertwined (OECD, 2008). Fairness 
is perceived as an uninterrupted development of educational potentials regardless of 
children’s background and inclusion indicates attainment of a basic minimum standard of 
education by everyone who participates in the education system (OECD, 2008). The PESP 
contributes to maintaining fairness; however, maintaining a standard achievement level 
depends upon the school and classroom culture. However, a relatively limited amount of 
work has explored exactly how the PESP influences equitable access to quality education 
in Bangladesh and this present study aims at investigating the phenomenon through the 
adequacy/inadequacy of learning materials, participation in the classroom teaching and 
learning process, and performance of the PESP receiving children from teachers and 
parent’s perception and perspectives.   
3.16 Summary of literature review  
The literature review suggests that CCT and PESP aim for short-term poverty reduction 
and long-term education development of poor families. CCT implementing countries in 
general spend a substantial amount of its education budget on CCT programme. 
Bangladesh also spends around one-fifth of its education budget for implementing the 
PESP programme. The CCT in many countries targets to break the intergenerational cycle 
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of poverty and some of these countries successfully reduce the income inequity and 
poverty. It reveals from different studies that, some of the very poor children are still not 
attending school in Bangladesh. It indicates that the PESP programme fails to create 
demand for education for them because the PESP implementation process is 
malfunctioning. Targeting efficiency is low, the beneficiaries are mishandled and obligated 
to pay bribes for securing the benefit; all the evidence suggests a weak PESP policy 
implementation practices prevail. It is a key expectation that the PESP programme will 
help to ensure necessary learning materials for poor children. Hossain and Zeitlyn (2010) 
argued that the inadequacy of learning materials of the PESP receiving children when 
compared to children who are not receiving the PESP benefit.  Their study also suggested 
that children without learning materials are comparatively low achievers in their grades 
However, there is no such study to examine why the PESP money fails to ensure learning 
materials for those children.  
Normally, the effectiveness of the PESP programme is measured through gross and net 
enrolment and school attendance rates of the children. Studies show the initial enrolment 
and attendance rate of the PESP children increases significantly and school leaver rates 
decrease.  However, little is known about how many PESP receiving children are 
completing the primary cycle with PESP money. In terms of educational achievement, 
CCT programmes show weak performance globally, although it appears that no study in 
Bangladesh that have attempted to measure the achievement level of the PESP programme 
participant children. An IFPRI study reveals the lower grade progression of the PESP 
beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries children in Bangladesh, however, it appears 
that no study has considered the effects of PESP on improvement in quality education. 
Understanding the effects of the PESP on classroom teaching and learning process is an 
uncharted area in Bangladesh. It is  likely that the programme is causing some crowding 
the classroom, but how the PESP implementation process affect the school management 
and operation process and how it impacts on teaching and learning environment is not 
explored yet. Private tutoring as a social phenomenon arises out of a desire to translate 
wealth into educational achievement and create inequity in the education system. In 
Bangladesh, it is now an established norm to be successful in school. The PESP receiving 
families and the teachers see the money as an opportunity for obtaining private tutoring 
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and this opportunity brings in competition in this field. Poverty and exclusion from 
education is well documented in Bangladesh. The poor children, who continue in 
education, still obtain the lowest academic achievement and a lower proportion of them 
complete the primary cycle. The PESP money is presumed to be a motivating factor for the 
families and children to overcome some practical obstacles and to provide them with a 
sense of supports against psychological alienation from the society and from the school. It 
is important to understand how these assumptions work in the real life situation.  
The review suggests that in spite of huge government spending, children from low-income 
families tend not to attend schools and those who do, and receive the PESP benefits tend to 
perform badly. The PESP implementation process suffers from targeting inefficiency, 
bribery, and mishandling of the beneficiaries. It reveals that the PESP provokes private 
tutoring and private spending, although it fails to provide adequate learning material for the 
poor children. However, there is currently, limited work enabling us to understand how this 
noble government effort turns into futility and why the beneficiaries accept it. The current 
study will contribute to this knowledge gap by providing innovative perspectives and 
perceptions of the PESP receiving families, the teacher, and the head teacher. 
The study will contribute to knowledge in three main ways. First it will explore the 
perceptions of the beneficiaries about the strengths and weakness of the PESP operation 
and its impact on their own lives. Secondly, I shall explore how the PESP influences the 
classroom teaching and learning process through parents’ perception and from the 
teacher’s perspective. Usually, people see it unimportant to take parental views on 
classroom practices, but the reality is people keep an eye on these social institutions those 
who expect quality services irrespective of their background. This will bring a new aspect 
of investigating the effects of the PESP from the parent’s perspective. Thirdly, it will be 
original because, I shall look into the research findings from a theoretical perspective. This 
theoretical assumption maintains that the function of the education system is to conserve 
existing social relations, inculcate a particular habitus and consecrate the current capricious 
scheme of meaning (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990:198). I used a qualitative case study 
approach as the research strategy and selected a rural primary school implementing the 
PESP as a unit of analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4:    METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodology used in conducting the research. The chapter 
focuses on my research position and the methodological orientation in conducting the 
research. It also discusses sampling and data collection processes and the techniques used. 
Discussion about data analysis, ethical issues, validity and reliability and limitations of the 
study are also included in this chapter.   
4.2 Philosophical stance  
The aim of my inquiry is to analyze socioeconomic and cultural structures that constrain 
the PESP implementation process. The nature of reality, in my perception, lies in historical 
realism where reality is shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender 
values crystallized over time (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). However, during the course of my 
research journey, I gained a constructivist philosophical position in examining and 
interpreting the experiences of the research participants. Thus, I realize ‘social realities’ are 
constructed under a set of structured value systems and with a set of concepts, those are 
usually explained in theories and without a theory nothing is to be researched (Silverman, 
2005). My cognizance of social reality is a result of individual’s cognition, and ‘social 
phenomena’ are subjective and socially constructed (Cohen, et al. 2000). This 
epistemological assumption (the subjective reality of social phenomenon) has emanated 
from my ontological belief that objects are merely words and no independently accessible 
thing constitutes the meaning of a word (Cohen and Manion, 1994). In uncovering ‘social 
reality’, it is important to rely on knowledge that springs from experience, insights, and 
unique personal nature. Therefore, my primary responsibility is to describe phenomena as 
experienced and expressed by the respondents and focus on their interpretation. The 
purpose of this research is not merely to understand the present PESP implementation 
processes, but to change to ensure equitable access to education.  
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It is, therefore, necessary to understand the relationships between school and the PESP 
receiving parents in particular and the society at large to comprehend how schools 
perpetuate inequity. Policy plays a major role and serves as guiding principles for 
constructing and distributing ‘social realities’ which are accepted as ‘truth’ by many whose 
interests may not necessarily be served by accepting it (Apple, 2000). Exploration of those 
conflicting realities is possible only through ‘empathizing and identifying’ people to know 
how they see the reality imposed upon them and how they experience it. This essentially 
leads to understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the PESP programme in which they 
participate and how meaning and values of the programme are ‘read’ by them (Yanow, 
1996).  
4.3 Research approach  
The theoretical assumption embedded in this study is that education reproduces 
socioeconomic power relationships by disfavouring disadvantaged people and the PESP 
programme plays a countervailing role by supporting disadvantaged people with resources 
(GOB, 2011d). The focus of the study is to understand points of view of the PESP 
participants and teachers regarding the implementation of the programme and its effect on 
enhancing access to quality education. The qualitative research approach is adopted as it 
provides an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under discussion. This research is 
the kind of social inquiry that focuses on the way people interpret and make sense of their 
experience and the world around them.  
4.4 Case study 
I use a  case study approach as a research strategy in  order  to gain a ‘holistic impression’ 
of the PESP participants, teacher and head teacher of a PESP  implementing school of the 
merits and demerits of the intervention (Punch, 2005). The case study gives information 
concerning people in their normal, natural, and real situations with the aim of yielding deep 
comprehension (Cohen et al. 2007). The present qualitative case study has maintained a 
constructivist philosophical position in interpreting the experiences of the programme 
participants (Yin, 2003) of the programme’s efficacy in children’s learning and school 
management in a particular context. I examined the differences in the social reality of 
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beneficiaries to achieve a holistic understanding of their experience (Merriam, 1998 cited 
in Brown, 2008).  
In exploring the process and effects of the PESP policy, a rural primary school 
implementing the PESP is taken as a unit of analysis. The case study is thus a single school 
case study and it explores how the PESP is implemented and about how it produces desired 
outcomes (Yin, 2003). I wanted to explore the reality of the PESP, which is implemented 
in a certain social context and interpreted as a subjective reality of the programme 
participants. In doing so, I explored the phenomenon in a particular context using a variety 
of data sources (Baxter and Jack, 2008). In this sense, it is an embedded single case study 
design with more than one unit of analysis (Yin, 2009). The teacher, head teacher, parents 
of school leavers, low achievers, and children who completed primary school are taken as 
subunits of the school unit and so it is an embedded single case study design (Yin, 2009). 
The main unit is the school as a whole and smallest unit is the individual members (Figure 
1).  
Figure1: Subunits of the case study school unit 
 
Unit of analysis is a central concept in understanding, preparing and implementing a case 
study (Yin, 2003). According to Patton (2002), deciding on an appropriate unit of analysis 
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is to decide what one wants to say at the end of the study. The perception of reality of the 
informants is embedded in their contexts of reality and it is influenced by researchers’ 
knowledge of the transformability process and selecting case and unit of analysis 
(Grunbaum, 2007). This case study gave an intensive description and analysis of the 
strengths and weakness of the PESP and its effect on school and classroom management. 
This case study generates rich data and brings to light the context of the participants and 
processes of the intervention on the efficiency and impact of the intervention. A qualitative 
case study is an ideal design for understanding and interpreting educational phenomena as 
it reflects an in-depth understanding of the situation and meaning for those who are 
involved in the process. The present research was appropriate for case study approach 
because it sought better understanding of why different groups of children perform 
differently in response to the PESP; some completed the full cycle of primary education 
and some did not.  
4.5 Sampling  
According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, a sample is a subset of a population whose 
properties are studied to obtain data about the whole population. With quantitative data, the 
essential requirement is that the sample is as representative as it is possible to be of the 
population from which it is drawn. However, in qualitative research, when a particular 
group is targeted in order to gain ‘full knowledge’ it is not necessary to represent the wider 
population and a non-probability sampling strategy can be adopted (Cohen, et al. 2000).  
Purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling method in which researchers select a 
sample(s) based on their judgment about typicality of some appropriate characteristics 
required for the case (Cohen, et al. 2007). In the present research, a purposive sampling 
strategy was used by including a particular type of school which was implementing the 
PESP. The study school was a government primary school, located in the northern part of 
the country. The school was situated in a village, 6 kilometres away from a small town. It 
was a densely populated area fraught with poor people, mostly migrated in losing their 
home due to river erosion. Besides, most of the population who employed previously in the 
cartwheel making industries for the ages became jobless after the 90s due to the 
replacement of this traditional rural transportation.  As a result, many children of these 
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‘skilled cartwheel makers’ turn into poor wage labourers in various informal economic 
sectors with meagre income opportunity. The study school is enrolling most children from 
these poor families. This is a one-shift primary school with around 700 students and 8 
female and 2 male teachers guided by a female head teacher. This is more or less a typical 
primary school spread all over the riverine settlements and the school authority suggested 
selecting such a primary school situated on the bank of a river. I selected the present school 
from two given names supplied by the local school authority due to its better 
communication facility.  
To gain a fuller understanding of the implementation process and its effect on the school, 
students, and community as a whole, the present qualitative study was designed.  A rural 
primary school was selected because urban schools were excluded from the PESP. Data 
were collected from three groups of parents.  
Group 1 consisted of parents (n=2) who were selected for the PESP but whose children 
could not meet the conditions (attendance and achievement) and their benefit was 
rescinded. Schoolteachers identified a group of such students studying in grades 3-4. 
According to the list, I went to those deprived parent’s house to consult with them to 
obtain their permission to be included in the research. I selected randomly two such parents 
from the list and fixed a date for the interview with them. These parents provided an in-
depth understanding of the context and processes how the PESP operated in enhancing the 
learning of their children and improving school operation. The role of the PESP, as well as 
the role of the school in overcoming children’s probable exclusion from education, was 
also explored.   
Group 2 consisted of  parents (n=2) of children who were included in the PESP benefits 
with 3-5 years of schooling, but whose children dropped out without completing a full 5 
year’s primary education cycle. Two such parents of school leaver children with PESP 
were selected maintaining the same procedure stated above. The schoolteachers considered 
children who have not attended school for more than 6 months as dropouts.   
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Group 3 consisted of parents (n=2) whose children had benefitted from the PESP, and 
completed a full cycle of primary schooling and had remained in school, were also 
selected. All interviews followed the same procedure.  
The school-completed children came from the ‘less poor’ or ‘moderately poor’ households 
in comparison with school leavers and the PESP rescinded children’s family. This was 
expressed by the respondents during discussion sessions while they were explaining their 
social status, income, and occupations. It was also depicted through their housing and 
living conditions in terms of household assets, reading room facilities for their children, 
etc., that I observed during interview sessions in their house. The head teacher and an 
assistant teacher, who had been involved more with the PESP due to her local background, 
were selected for this study as respondents. The teacher and head teacher presented both 
supply and demand side aspects of the PESP and the reasons for any deviation of the PESP 
implementation process and efficacy of the service.  
4.6 Semi-structured interview schedules  
 Bryman (2008) describes two main types of interview namely structured and unstructured. 
Unstructured interviews resemble everyday conversations and the researcher has little 
control over the interview process, although it allows a wide range of issues to be covered. 
Unstructured interviews often depend on the spontaneous social interaction between the 
researcher and the participant. According to Patton (2002), unstructured interviews are a 
‘natural extension’ of the participant observation process.  In the current study, completely 
unstructured interviews were not suitable because, my interviews were not an ‘extension’ 
of participant observation, rather I had specific research questions and a theoretical 
framework to look into the PESP participant’s realities which, unstructured interviews 
could not explore (Punch, 1998).  It is also a fact that unstructured interviews can lead to 
very different types of responses with no real conclusion (Yin, 2009).  
Semi-structured interviews were used for collecting data to obtain detailed insights into 
how respondents view the world (Bryman, 2008), the world in relation to the PESP and its 
effects on their children’s education. I believe that knowledge is situated and contextual, 
and therefore, the purpose of the interview is to ensure that the relevant contexts are 
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brought into focus so that situated knowledge can be produced. The semi-structured 
interview schedules for the teacher, head teacher, and parents included a list of topics 
related to the PESP implementation process, effects of the programme on school and 
students’ learning and on the parent-teacher relationship. I developed and used five 
different interview schedules (annex 1-5) namely: 
 for parents of primary school completed children who received the PESP benefit 
for five years,  
 for parents of school leaver children who received the benefit before their 
children’s school leaving,  
 for parents of ongoing students those who were not receiving the PESP benefits 
anymore,   
 for a teacher of the selected study school, and   
 for the head teacher of the selected study school. 
The interview schedules were developed considering the context of the parents and 
teachers. The language and concepts used were explained in a way that was easily 
understandable for them. I did a field test of schedules prepared for the parents before 
finalization to understand how much the concepts were understandable and how effectively 
these could be communicated to them. The concepts of ‘quality’ and ‘equity’, for example, 
were supposed to be difficult for the parents to understand; however, during field testing, I 
found that people understood the issues and put forward their own perceptions on those 
based on their own perspective. The logic for developing three different schedules for 
parents was to understand how and in what conditions, parents and their children associate 
or disassociate with the PESP programme and schooling as well, in spite of more or less 
similar background of the parents.  
The parents who have experienced children’s successful completion of primary education 
may be economically quite similar to the parents of early school leavers or low achieving 
children. However, their expectation and motivation towards their children’s education can 
be different and influenced by other social, emotional, and educational aspects of their 
lives compared to parents of school leaver and low achieving children. The parents who 
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are still struggling to keep their children in the school, in spite of the adversities related to 
their children’s education and cancelation of the PESP benefit require different approaches 
and issues to discuss.  
Therefore, heterogeneity among parents compelled me to take three sample parent groups 
and my research topic also encouraged me to increase the number of interviewee groups. I 
wanted to understand the richness and complexity and different context of the PESP 
implementation process and this essentially pushed me to follow an idiographic approach 
in order to build a broader argument from an understanding of particularity. This led me to 
rely on enough variations of circumstances in interviewees and guided me in preparing 
three interview schedules for three different groups. At the same time, I used the interview 
schedule to collect basic information on the individual family as well as their child’s 
education and school related information.     
4.7 Data collection  
Social research is about the collection of data with a view to enhancing knowledge of 
particular social phenomena (Pole and Lampard, 2002). A naturalistic approach to data 
collection is believed to keep natural events, participation, relationship, and interactions 
uninterrupted during field investigation (Patton, 1990). As a researcher, I collected data 
from the participants of the study of my own and before collecting data, I contacted the 
parents, teachers, and head teachers personally to obtain their permission for their 
participation in this study. During the interviews, the schedules were not followed rigidly 
but guided by the issues. Due care and attention were taken in ensuring that all interview 
topics were covered. In some cases, questions were either re-formulated or extended to 
include issues which emerged during the session. Before interview sessions, I visited the 
place on the previous day to make sure that the place where we would sit for interviews 
was safe and suitable for dialogue. I reached the interview place early to make all the 
arrangements. I read out the informed consent documents for the parents who could not 
read. I took some time to seek their consent after reading the consent documents, so that, 
the participants could have enough time to decide about their participation in the 
discussion sessions and upon their consent, I started the discussion. To reproduce data 
accurately, I also sought permission from the participant to record it using a tape recorder.  
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An interview is a socially constructed event, which results in a collection of information 
about particular social phenomena involving particular people at a particular time and in a 
particular place (Pole and Lampard, 2002). The knowledge, therefore, that the interview 
yielded was inevitably constrained and shaped by the circumstances in which the 
interviews were conducted. I took account of the extent to which the interviews might have 
been influenced (Pole and Lampard, 2002) and maintained my personal diary for recording 
this information to explore the issue later from a different group of informants. I used the 
schedule in such a way that respondents had sufficient time to explore their own ideas in 
response to my invitation to talk. I also asked follow up questions in order to clarify certain 
issues which I could not initially understand.  
4.8 Use of personal diary  
An important part of data collection is effective documentation and retention of collected 
data. There are numerous factors that can misrepresent the data and blur the meaning due 
to language and communication problems of both the interviewer and interviewees. 
However, people do not communicate all information through oral language. Additional 
information comes through body language and other signs that are particular to the context, 
such as head nodding, hand waving and being reticent in a certain moment. To capture all 
those non-verbal expressions of the respondent, I maintained a personal diary throughout 
the data collection period. I recorded such significant events during interview sessions and 
recorded observations of particular situations and my feelings of a particular event (Koshy, 
2005). This reflective process of writing a personal diary, contributed much to review my 
own queries and ambiguity of any information during the data collection period and 
beyond (Bell, 2005).  
4.9 Data analysis  
“The qualitative data analysis involves organising, accounting for and explaining the data; 
in short, making sense of data in terms of the participants’ definition of the situation, 
noting patterns, themes, categories and regularities” (Cohen, et al. 2007: p. 461). The 
approach to data analysis in this study was interpretive, a reflexive interaction between my 
conception and the social phenomenon (Cohen, et al. 2007). This study explores 
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conceptions of the PESP beneficiaries and teacher and head teacher of the study school to 
understand the effectiveness of the intervention from their own perspectives. In explaining 
the perceptions of the programme participants, I followed a systematic analysis of the data 
that carried through transcription and summarisation, excerption of relevant concepts, and 
integration of descriptions from different interviewees (Rubin and Rubin, 2012). I 
emphasised personal perceptions of individuals rather than shared social construction in 
understanding the efficacy of the PESP processes (Moustakas, 1990). To keep the essence 
of the original data, sometimes I used direct phrases and sentences of the programme 
participants in analysing data (Cohen, et al. 2007). 
I organised the analysis by research questions to draw together all the relevant data. The 
data analysis took shape as a composite summary of all the interviews and enabled the 
capture of the essence of the facts (Cohen, et al. 2007). The analysis provided a rich 
context and basis for further critical policy studies and its effective implementation.  
My data analysis followed a reflexive process in order to gain an insight and to develop 
meaning through an inductive approach. ‘Inductive analysis means that the patterns, 
themes, and categories of analysis arise from the data; they emerge out of the data rather 
than being imposed on them prior to data collection and analysis’ (Patton, 1980, p. 306). 
However, patterns, themes, and categories do not emerge on their own; and therefore the 
resulting interpretation was obviously influenced by what I wanted to know. The 
interpretations and analyses were also influenced by the theoretical framework, the 
ontological and epistemological positions, and by my professional knowledge and 
integrity, which led to a subjective interpretation of the PESP processes. The process was 
highly reflective and continually sharpened by my iterative process of identifying gaps in 
my understandings of the issues I analysed and in this process; I always went back to the 
data to get the significance of it (Srivastava, 2009). My personal diary also helped me to 
keep my ‘interpretive crisis’ limited.     
4.10 Ethical considerations  
Research participants are the rich source of information about their own situation since 
they are living with the circumstances and spending their time and money and other 
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resources for their children’s education. Some of the parents belonged to vulnerable 
dependent groups, especially those who lost their PESP benefits due to their children’s 
exclusion from the school and not fulfilling the conditions of the PESP.  
Considering the sensitivity of the situation, appropriate care was taken throughout the 
research process. I completed the ethical application form and took permission from the 
ethical review committee of the University of Sussex where all the consent forms for all 
research participant groups were examined, reviewed and accepted (Annex 7). To 
safeguard the vulnerability and dependency of the research participants I took necessary 
steps to minimize the risks related to the study. First the consent form was read to all 
participant parents with due emphasis placed on their voluntary participation and their right 
to refuse to respond to any question and their right to withdraw. Second, my sympathetic 
views of the access and equity issues were reflected in my mannerisms   thus encouraging 
participants to be more open in sharing their feelings regarding decisions about 
participation in the study as well as in the PESP.  
All social research involves ethical issues (Punch, 2006). I followed the general protocols 
and procedures for interviewing by obtaining consent from the participants. I also provided 
them with full information about the research, including reasons for selecting a particular 
group of participants. I also assured them that their privacy, confidentiality, and anonymity 
would be guaranteed. I explained orally the information sheet to the parents of excluded 
children to get oral consent. The ethics process followed was oral, not written. Protecting 
the welfare of the parents and safeguarding other important concerns such as respect for 
autonomy, rights, and personal dignity, I carefully formulated questions where parents’ 
knowledge of the issue was given priority which I personally believed should have been.  
Special care was taken to safeguard all information given by parents. I did not divulge the 
information to anyone. In addition, all data were securely stored on password protected 
media   and in a lockable cabinet. 
The analysis and write-up of data maintained participant’s anonymity throughout.   During 
the interview session, I used identifiers to keep data separate depending on the participant’s 
background and children’s access and participation status in the school as well as their 
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involvement in the PESP. Subsequently, all identifiers were removed and all participants 
were assigned pseudonyms. All participants were informed of their right to withdraw from 
the study at any point, without giving reason. A high level of ethical behaviour was 
observed throughout. 
4.11 Validity and reliability  
Lincoln and Guba (1989), argue that the term validity is not applicable to qualitative 
research. However, they do recognize that some systematic measures are needed to ensure 
the neutrality, consistency, applicability, and truth-value of the research findings. Maxwell 
(1992) describes five types of validity in qualitative research and these are descriptive, 
interpretive, theoretical, and evaluative validity and generalisability (cited in Cohen et al. 
2000). The validity of qualitative research is often referred to as ‘trustworthiness’ or 
‘credibility’. The ‘trustworthiness’ of research findings is always under question for any 
qualitative research and the common methods for assessing validity is suggested through 
consistency checks. The term understanding gives more importance for qualitative research 
than validity. Thus, there is a preference for understanding what is occurring rather than 
convincing the audience of the outcomes (Wolcott, 1994).  
On the other hand, Spencer et al. (2003) emphasised  listening more than talking, recording 
accurately, and beginning writing early and sharing ideas with others, reporting fully, 
seeking feedback, trying to achieve a balance through rigorous subjectivity, and writing 
accurately in producing valid qualitative research. The aim of social research is to offer the 
reader a richer and more in-depth data analysis in addition to the probable clarification of 
similar events (Cohen et al. 2000). To understand others’ situation in the similar 
circumstance, I tried to generalise the findings within the respondent groups and beyond. 
In qualitative research, it should also be assured that another researcher investigating the 
same issue or working with the same dataset would derive the same findings. Stenbacka 
(2001) argues that since the reliability issue relates to measurement it has no relevance in 
qualitative research. Golafshani (2003) also maintains that the concept of reliability is not 
relevant in qualitative research, but later he agrees with the need for reliability and 
trustworthiness in qualitative research.  
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In my view, quality is an integral part of qualitative research and I believe that the reality 
or social reality is not single and it cannot exist separately from our perceptions. I see the 
notion of reliability and validity as one of the ‘quality concepts’ in my research which can 
be upheld and sustained through trustworthiness and can be called as a ‘proper research’ 
(Stenbacka, 2001). This ‘proper research’ or ‘trustworthiness’ can be attained by 
establishing confidence in findings which is shaped and influenced by my perspectives and 
propositions about social phenomenon in which the PESP  operates (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). To maintain trustworthiness of my research, I disclosed clearly my research 
approach and epistemological position, socio-cultural context of the participants, and 
research settings to the readers. This methodological clarity, epistemological position, and 
background of the PESP participants put forward a context of the results and ensure 
trustworthiness of the study. On the other hand, I discussed the objectives of the research 
with participants and also built a relationship of trust and candour with them to understand 
their experiences. In analysing the data, I read the field notes several times carefully to find 
out the meaning and experiences that the participants tried to communicate through 
language and non-verbal expressions.  
Power relations, due to the position of the researcher may influence and change 
respondent’s behaviour and can generate inaccurate information. For example, my 
similarity with the educated teachers could be explained to the respondents as one of them 
as a class and colour. However, my professional and personal experiences gave me a 
deeper sensitivity of the issue; reading of relevant documents and studies of various kinds 
sensitised me of the phenomenon. I looked at the situation which was changing during 
interview sessions and recorded all the changes regarding the settings of the research and 
changes in the behaviour of the research participants to interpret the changing research 
context. My outsider status in the school and the community increased reliability and 
trustworthiness of my research by ensuring an unthreatening environment and encouraging 
respondents’ frankness.  
4.12 Reflexivity  
As the researchers are primary data collection instruments in the qualitative study, 
reflexivity is considered crucial. Reflexivity helps to understand the phenomenon under 
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research and the research process itself (Watt, 2007). It is an ability of the researcher to 
acknowledge that the researchers themselves influence inquiry and research findings in 
various ways. Reflexivity is an anatomy of the researcher by the researcher to validate his 
or her own research process and findings. A researcher reflects continuously on how their 
own actions, values, and perceptions can affect data collection and analysis (Lambert et al. 
2010). As a co-constructor of meaning, the researcher approaches to subjectivity by 
“bracketing” and “monitoring of self” (Peshkin, 1988). Phenomenologists have coined the 
term bracketing to describe the process of becoming aware of one’s implicit assumptions 
and predispositions and setting them aside to avoid having them unduly influence the 
research (Husserl, 1931, cited in Morrow, 2005). Horsburgh (2003) examines reflexivity as 
the researcher’s acknowledgement of his or her own actions and decisions that inevitably 
impact upon the meaning and context of the experience (cited in Lambert et al. 2010).    
Reflexivity can be seen from different points of view: systemic reflexivity, methodological 
reflexivity and epistemological reflexivity (Ryan, 2005). Epistemic reflexivity deals with 
the researcher’s belief system and it tests theoretical and methodological presuppositions. 
My epistemological reflexivity encourages me to rethink continuously of my research 
questions as to how it fit into my overall research design, what if I investigated research 
questions differently, and how it would be translated into the interview schedules. The first 
reflexive exercise I engaged in was to look at my reasons for researching this particular 
topic. I also continuously returned to my theoretical assumptions and broad theoretical 
base through which I explored the social reality.   
This continuous reflection reminds me to adjust and readjust my research questions, 
research methods, assumptions, and personal beliefs at the initial stage of my research 
(Mruck & Breuer, 2003).  On the other hand, I was aware that I am going to work with a 
group of people who are different in their belief system, behaviour and background and it 
always push me to think of how I will start and continue the discussion and what will be 
my strategy if I fail to place my issue on the table and what if I myself fail to understand 
their responses. These, in effect, encourage re-thinking strategies, changing instruments, 
and understanding cognitive cultures in line with respondent’s perspective and needs.  
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In the field investigation, I used a researcher’s journal to maintain my reflexivity keeping 
records of my thoughts, feelings, related to the interview process that helped me to be self-
aware of the process (Lambert, et al. 2010). This journal helped me to be more 
introspective of my biases, feelings, and thoughts by taking stock of consistency and by 
reflecting on my interactions with the respondents.  
The most difficult part of the reflexivity was to detach myself from the emotional 
attachment with the topic I selected primarily for this study, which was fashioned by my 
working background and my reading of the literature for the second phase of my doctoral 
coursework.   
4.13 Positionality  
Qualitative research stands for collaborative meaning making process shaped by both 
researcher and participants. Therefore, the perceived identity of both researcher and 
participant play an important role in the research process. The perceived identity places 
people in the specific social field and they act according to the rules of that field. Bourdieu 
indicates that people can be placed in more than one field at a time, which acknowledges 
the possibility of having multiple identities and positionality of the researcher and 
participants. People make meaning from various aspects of their identity and so 
positionality is one of the important parts of reflexivity. Reflexivity continuously examines 
researcher’s systemic, epistemological, and methodological reflexivity, but reflexivity does 
not examine participant’s belief, assumptions, presuppositions, which also important issue 
to be investigated to get the ‘legitimate truth’. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000), 
qualitative methodology faces a triple crisis of representation, legitimation, and praxis 
(cited in Day, 2012).  
Positionality can play an important role in the knowledge creation process. The process of 
the social scientific method within which the researcher is positioned, creates the problem 
for the subjective researcher. Bourdieu (2004) argues that the “reformist reflexive” analysis 
goes beyond explaining researcher’s experience and the steps taken in the research process 
rather it helps them understanding their own position within a field and how academic 
universe obstructs knowing this reality. To deal with this positionality problem, I also take 
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resort to reflexivity as the main tool. People tend to gravitate towards whom they feel some 
level of similarity. My professional background, as an education researcher for the   largest 
NGO in the country, has shaped my mindset in favour of working with the poor children in 
the country. This working ethos has created a permanent attitude towards working for the 
disadvantaged families and children to improve their condition. This positive attitude and 
empathic notion became obvious through my behaviour and I believed poor people took 
me as one of them. My rural background also helps me to understand the power relation, 
position, and dispositions of the participants and I usually humble myself during the 
interview session, which I believe solves the positionality problem from both my part and 
from the part of the participants.  
4.14 Limitation of the study 
There are a number of limitations of the case study approach as a research strategy. The 
case study approach has been defined as an in-depth investigation of a single case that 
enables the researcher to access to a holistic view of the phenomenon under the study. This 
single case study was taken as a typical or representation sample that increased its 
reliability in investigating the reality (Yin, 2003). However, it is generally accepted that 
case study findings cannot be generalized to a population beyond cases similar to those 
studies (Yin, 2009). The snapshot or cross-sectional case study focuses on cases at a 
particular point in time (Cohen et al. 2007). Unlike a longitudinal study, a snapshot case 
study attempts to collect all relevant data at a point in time. This increases possibilities for 
a researcher to fail to fully understand the research context. To minimize the limitation, I 
have taken multiple sources of data by including three groups of parent and teacher and 
head teacher of the study school that gives me a rich and diversified content and context on 
a relevant issue under discussion. Moreover, I spent a considerable amount of time in the 
field that provided me with the opportunity to collect repeated information on key issues 
from various participants. Although, the study took adequate measures to understand the 
social reality of participants in their own context, some other limitations are likely. One of 
the influential barriers to communication during interview session was the colloquial 
language or local accent of the participants, which varies from one area to another in 
Bangladesh. In addition, in many cases, body language differs from place to place. In such 
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cases, I talked to teachers and head teachers about the meaning of such differences and 
later tried to understand the meaning. In a few cases, I checked with parents to clarify from 
the meaning of their gestures.  
4.15 Conclusion 
I have discussed in this chapter the methodology of this study, including my 
epistemological and ontological position. I have also discussed the rationale for selecting a 
single case as a unit of analysis and subunits of the school unit (individual members) as an 
embedded single case study design. The implications of my sampling and data collection 
process are also discussed. My approach to data analysis is presented to explore research 
participants’ individualized contexts and their personal understanding of the reality. This 
chapter also discussed ethical issues related to protocols and procedures as well as the 
limitation of the study. The next chapter presents findings of the study.  
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CHAPTER 5: PESP OPERATION IN BANGLADESH 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses and presents the data collected from all participants in the case study 
school. All the interviews were transcribed and the analysis was carried out in several 
stages.  
In stage 1, the recorded interviews were listened to in their entirety on a number of 
occasions; this included bracketing my own interpretation to enter the unique world of the 
individual interviewee. Multiple listening also enabled a sense of the whole to be gained, 
which later helped me to understand the context of the emerging specific units of meaning 
and themes. In stage 2, a general sense of context of the participant was acquired through 
verbal and non-verbal gestures and the units of general meaning of the participant were 
identified and noted.  In stage 3, initially identified general units of meaning were reduced 
to units of meaning relevant to the research questions. 
Whilst in stage 4, the lists of relevant meaning were prepared eliminating redundancies. 
Then, the units of relevant meaning naturally cluster together, were grouped for 
determining some common themes. In stage 5, following an iterative process, a series of 
general themes emerged for the entire 8 interviews into which all data could be assigned.  
However, in analysing and understanding participants’ perceptions of the PESP policy, I 
also examined the individual’s perspective, personal construct and their negotiated 
meaning from an interpretive approach.          
This chapter presents 13 themes arising from the data analysis process and will begin to 
respond to the first research question: ‘what do parents; teacher and head teacher see as 
the strengths and weaknesses of the PESP in increasing demand for education?’  
5.2 Catchment area policy  
To increase access to education and school participation for poor children, the Directorate 
of Primary Education (DPE) developed and adopted several strategies and policies. The 
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demarcation of the school catchment area is one such strategy that ensures that the 
designated school within a geographical area takes all the responsibility for serving all the 
school-aged children in that area. It is expected that all the primary school age children 
within a school catchment area attend the government primary school and those who are 
relatively poor receive the PESP benefit. It is also expected that the government primary 
schools ensure equal opportunity for getting quality education for all children resident in 
their catchment area.  On the other hand, the PESP policy proposes an equal proportion of 
poor children to be included from all school catchment areas irrespective of its 
socioeconomic and demographic conditions.  
The head teacher reported that, according to the school catchment area policy, no other 
schools were allowed to operate within the school catchment area, all the primary school 
aged children were supposed to enrol in this school. However, there was one religious 
school, one kindergarten, and one NGO school in the study school catchment area which 
were not included in the PESP programme, the head teacher said.   
No matter what the catchment area policy, two parents (mother of a school leaver and a 
PESP rescinded child) wanted to send their children to the NGO school in order to benefit 
from its better performance although they had to give up PESP money. However, due to a 
shortage of seat capacity they could not enrol them in the NGO school. In reply to a 
question of why poor families prefer the NGO school where there is no PESP money, the 
teacher responded:     
The children need not go to the private tutor, as there are only a limited 
number of children that a teacher can take care of. This imbues most of 
the poor parents with preferential affection for NGO schools (interview 
#7). 
The NGO schools are established basically for the poor early school leavers (from grade 1 
and 2) or children who have never enrolled in any school at the age of eight to provide 
them with a second chance education opportunity. These poorest NGO school children are 
being deprived of the PESP benefit partially due to the PESP policy and partially due to the 
catchment area policy where they lose their legitimacy in other school catchment areas.   
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Sommers (2013) found similar findings that very poor parents prefer ‘quality education’ 
for their children and not the stipend money and found PESP had little to do with 
increasing demand for education among the poor families. The head teacher also admitted 
to the comparatively better quality of NGO schools noting as follows:  
Due to large class size, the government primary school is unable to 
provide ‘quality’ education as the NGO school is providing (interview 
#8). 
It suggests that the inability of the government primary school to meet the educational 
needs of all children in the catchment area due to unjustified large catchment area with 
large number of school age population.  
As mentioned previously, the catchment area of this study school is thickly populated with 
relatively poor people of the union (smallest unit of local government) due to river erosion 
and resettlement. However, due to the general policy, all the rural primary schools were 
instructed to select 50 percent of children from poor families and thus the study school also 
had to select PESP beneficiaries accordingly. This created huge problems since most of the 
parents were poor and it was difficult for the school to differentiate poverty based on their 
household assets or income. According to the teacher:  
Earlier, 40 percent of the enrolled children got the PESP benefit. This 
year it has been increased to 50 percent by the government. However, 
the main problem is that most of the families deserve the PESP benefit 
since the rate of poverty is very high in this location. Almost all the 
parents expect PESP benefit for their children and I think we should give 
at least 80 percent of our children PESP card if the economic condition 
is taken into consideration. Many of the rickshaw pullers even are being 
excluded from the programme because we cannot give it to more than 50 
percent of the enrolled children (interview #7).  
This means, equal amounts of PESP beneficiary selection from all school catchment areas, 
irrespective of its economic vibrancy and food security status, may leave some people in 
need when compared to less poor people in other comparatively well off school catchment 
areas. The head teacher described her school catchment area as a highly food insecure area 
and expressed her concern for not including all the poor children in the PESP.   
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According to head teacher: 
The general rule for providing 40/50 percent children with PESP benefit 
is not applicable to all areas. Especially, this is a very poor area with the 
less cultivable land. Most of the people are day labour or rickshaw/van 
puller. Who will you include or exclude (interview #7)?  
This perception of the teacher suggests that all the school catchment areas have their own 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics which should be taken into considered in 
any type of large scale education policy implementation. Excluding NGO school children 
from the PESP benefit is a discrimination against poor families and an error of the 
catchment area concept.    
5.3 Parental attentiveness in beneficiary selection  
Based on the findings of the study, the PESP beneficiary selection process can be divided 
into two broad categories. First, the selection at the entry grade of primary schooling, when 
children enrol in the school and the second is the allocation of the PESP benefit to children 
based on their performance from second through fifth grades of primary school. This study 
shows that the children, who have continued their PESP benefit throughout their primary 
grades, came from relatively less vulnerable families compared to the families who lost the 
PESP benefit. Specifically, families of one low performing girl and one school leaver boy 
reported they were so poor that they could not provide enough food for their children. 
Interestingly, both of the less poor (not vulnerable) mothers reported that they went to 
different persons for ensuring their candidacy and receiving the money. A mother of a 
primary school graduate girl said:  
I went directly to the Upazila Education Officer (UEO), one of my 
classmates, for pushing him to allocate ‘PESP card’ for my daughter. 
The UEO assured me of allocating the card since he was the ultimate 
signing authority for the benefit. In this manner, the name of my girl was 
included in the PESP list and approved by the school committee later 
(interview #2).  
It is true that the family met the criteria for the PESP benefit since she is a moderately poor 
widow living in her brother’s house. Maybe she was afraid that her daughter would not get 
the benefit if it were distributed fairly since there were many other poorer children in the 
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school. Alternatively, she may have had doubts about the fair distribution of the PESP 
benefit that prompted her to appeal to the higher authority to ensure her right to the benefit. 
Alternatively, maybe she saw no harm in using classmates for influencing decisions 
regarding allocation of the benefit. Whatever the perception, the way she secured the 
benefit was improper and the local education officer could have encouraged her to apply 
properly. In contrast, a mother of another primary school completed boy stated: 
I went to the head teacher to insist her in allocating PESP benefit to my 
son. I also went to a local influential person (political leader) for 
imploring him to convince the SMC of my indigence. Doing ‘so many 
things’, I manage the ‘PESP card’ for my child (interview #3).  
Here, “so many things,” she described as expending time for helping their household 
activities and taking part in their political rallies. This family had a political ally with that 
‘influential’ person (recently this person was serving as a SMC member) and worked for 
them during local government election, the mother said in the discussion session.  That is, 
she secured the benefit by working with the official. In both the cases, the families were 
comparatively ‘well-off’, and the school teacher was not willing to give them PESP ‘card’, 
as she mentioned. However, their network and social capital helped them to obtain the 
benefit. While, the school leavers and low performing children came from poorer families 
compared to the families of school-completed children and none of these parents went to 
the teachers or other people to secure the PESP benefit as they knew their initial 
entitlement could not be rejected due to their abject poverty.    
5.4 Selection of PESP beneficiary 
The study suggests that teachers, in general, had a minimal role to play in deciding which 
child would be selected for the PESP benefit. According to the head teacher: 
The ‘local’ schoolteachers in concurrence with the School Management 
Committee (SMC) prepare the list of probable PESP beneficiaries where 
school survey report plays an insignificant role (interview #8). 
Here she indicated ‘local’ school teachers as the teachers who would reside in this school 
catchment area and most of the female teachers (including the head teacher) of this school 
resided in the town nearby and knew little about the socioeconomic background of 
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students. Most of these ‘outsider’ teachers were unable to contribute to the PESP 
beneficiary selection process and the ‘local’ teachers had to take the decision for selection.  
It is worth mentioning here that most of these local female teachers were also ‘outsiders’ in 
a true sense because they came from other areas. In this context, the PESP beneficiary 
selection process was influenced by the SMC who claimed to know the children well. The 
head teacher usually endorsed the decision of the SMC. The head teacher opined:  
The SMC plays a key role in selecting the PESP children since they 
know the children very well (interview #8). 
This indicated her minimum contribution to the beneficiary selection process and she could 
not justify or refute exclusion and inclusion of individual children in the PESP. This 
dependence on other local teacher who was mostly influenced by the SMC created 
unwanted problems in the school operation and management process. According to the 
head teacher:   
In many cases, the selection goes awry due to lack of authentic 
information about the families and it takes huge time and energy to 
correct it. Because, the stipend ‘card holders’ try to sustain the benefit 
using all possible measures (interview #8). 
It implies that selection of the PESP beneficiaries for newly-enrolled children at the first 
grade did not go very well in this school. On the other hand, the lack of clear-cut criteria 
for measuring poverty encouraged most of the parents to claim the PESP benefit. 
According to the teacher: 
Everybody considers himself as a poor person since there is no single 
measurement of poverty (interview #7). 
This is complicated by a general perception and impression that ‘good students’ get the 
PESP benefit. According to a teacher: 
The parents of good students from well-off family background also 
expect PESP money for their children and children who are very good in 
their class also claim PESP benefit in spite of their better-off background 
(interview #7).  
65 
The data suggests that the ambiguous perceptions of the purposes of the stipend 
programme greatly influenced the PESP beneficiary selection process in this study school. 
5.5 Continuation of PESP benefits 
It was noted that the beneficiary selection criterion changed as children progressed 
to the upper classes. The teacher stated:  
The first priority is given to the child’s family background in selecting 
PESP beneficiaries. However, for the next grades, academic 
performance comes to the fore (interview #7).  
This suggests, at the initial stage, the PESP beneficiary selection process was guided by the 
SMC and the selection criteria depended on the intensity of the poverty. However, the 
teacher took control over the process in collaboration with SMC after one year, when 
attendance and performance criteria were introduced as a condition for continuation of the 
benefit. However, selecting wealthy children in the successive years remained a decision 
for discussion with the SMC. The SMC defended the school’s decision by convincing poor 
people in explaining the rules of the PESP and using their influence who lost the benefit to 
wealthy children and thus the school got support from the community to maintain the 
process.   
In the upper grades, selection and continuation of PESP beneficiaries depends on 
children’s academic performance and regular school attendance. As a result, the selection 
and continuation of PESP beneficiaries mostly rely on their children’s ability to perform 
well in the examination and the selection process becomes biased towards well-off children 
due to their better results in the upper grades. It is clear from the study that the poor are not 
receiving the full benefit; rather, many well-off families also have access due to their 
children’s better performance. The school also bestows PESP benefits to some of the ‘very 
good’ students (first, second and third position holders of each grade) irrespective of their 
family background. This confuses the children and other beneficiaries. All these 
irregularities in the beneficiary selection process create an impression that the poor 
children with low educational achievement are ‘incompetent’ and the families are 
penalized by rescinding their PESP benefits. This cessation of stipend money is 
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demoralizing for all the low-achieving children and their school performance gradually is 
reduced to incorrigibility and results in early school leaving.   
5.6 Cash money attracts non-poor families  
It is important to understand why wealthy people are interested in taking the PESP money 
which is not for them. The teacher reacted to the question of why affluent people took 
delivery of the PESP money by saying:  
PESP provides cash money. Everybody loves to get money. Getting 
money is not a bad thing at all. When well off parents see their children 
are doing well in the school examination, one of the potent conditions 
for getting the benefit, they cannot but claim the money. (Interview #7) 
This view indicates that the teacher dislikes this cash for education system of the PESP as 
it creates extra demand from relatively wealthy people. She also compared cash for 
education with the food for education approach and reported that the relatively less poor 
people would not come to claim the benefit if it were in kind (wheat for example). She 
said:  
If it were food, instead of money, people had to fetch it in front of 
everybody. It diminishes well off people’s social status; however, cash 
money can be consigned into the pocket before becoming ashamed. 
Besides, many non-poor parents feel proud of their children’s good 
performance in school and take the money as the reward (interview #7).  
This indicates that even wealthy people do not feel ashamed to claim the benefit even 
though it is not intended for them.  
Thus, the school faces tremendous pressure from the expectant parents and due to this 
weight of expectations; distribution of PESP benefits usually has gone awry. Cash was 
introduced instead of food as a cost-effective substitute at the design phase to prevent 
misappropriation of food at different stages of distribution tiers. However, this study shows 
that the cash stipend is becoming more expensive due to the diversion of the resource to 
the non-poor (Gentilini, 2007).   
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5.7 Inadequate stipend money  
At the early stage, when the Food for Education (FFE) programme was introduced in 1993, 
the target household got 20 kilograms of wheat for sending their children to the school. At 
the present market price, the value of the wheat is around 500 taka per month. However, in 
2002, the PESP was introduced and the amount of money was set at TK. 100 for one child 
per month. This was a sharp reduction in the real value of the stipend amount and the 
amount is now one fifth of the previous cash value of wheat. On the other hand, adjusting 
for inflation, the real value of that TK. 100 stand at TK. 50.51 in 2012 and in terms of rice 
equivalents, the real value of stipend has decreased from 7 kg of rice to 3.7 kg (GOB, 
2013a). By both measures, the value of stipend has declined by half since it was introduced 
in 2002 (GOB, 2013a). Educational expenses, in particular, have increased significantly in 
the last decade after introduction of cash for education in 2002. Consequently, the PESP 
amount does not meet educational needs. As a result, all of the participants who took part 
in the interviews were vociferous about the inadequacy of stipend amount. As one mother 
of a school leaver boy said:  
I spend 1,000 taka per month to stump up private coaching fees for three 
of my children, what is the worth of 100 taka here? Government is 
paying and we are just taking it; it does not help much for our children’s 
education (interview #1). 
The teacher also reported on the inadequacy of the PESP money to meet the opportunity 
cost of very poor children: 
Many children who received PESP benefits left the school because their 
parents thought that the child could earn 100 taka per day. Why would 
they keep him/her in the school for 100 taka per month (Interview # 7)?  
This suggests that the amount of PESP money is around 3.3 percent of the average monthly 
income of a child. Arends-Kuenning and Amin (2004) also showed that a child, who was 
involved in FFE programme, needed to work between 2 and 4.5 days a month to earn the 
equivalent value of what s/he received. These facts indicate that most of the poor parents 
consider that the amount of PESP money is not important for them, given the direct and 
opportunity costs of education.   
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5.8 Conditionality distortion 
The data suggest  that none of the  poorest children was excluded from the benefit initially, 
but when conditions were imposed, such as regular attendance and exam results, some 
poor children were unable to fulfil  these  and consequently they had to accept a reduced 
stipend amount and some even resigned their stipend benefit. The teacher said: 
The rule is, if any PESP beneficiary child stays out of school for 3 days 
in a month, s/he will not get the full amount of stipend for that month. 
Teachers calculate attendance figure for each month of a quarter and 
accordingly give requisition for money for that quarter. The children 
who remain absent more than 3/4 days in a month are subject to get a 
reduced amount of money for that quarter (interview #7). 
However, the calculation system creates huge confusion among the parents about the use 
of the amount deducted. Most of the parents believe that the teachers misappropriate the 
money. Teachers are also aware of this parental allegation. However, the teacher, and head 
teacher state that they do not know what the government does with the deducted amount. 
The head teacher said: 
It is not clearly spelled out in the policy that what will happen to the 
money which has been penalized by the school. We are penalizing the 
student by slashing their PESP amount and alienating them from the 
school, but we do not know where the money goes (interview #8).  
The data also suggests that the teachers also face problems with this condition. Although 
they deduct the money, they do not know what happens to it.    
Academic achievement is another condition for getting the PESP money and minimum 
requirement for continuation of the PESP benefit is 45 percent marks on average. 
However, in 2013, the minimum mark was set at 33 percent, since most of the PESP 
receiving children could not achieve the target.  According to the teacher:  
To protect low-performing children’s elimination from the PESP, last 
year the school authority has reduced the target marks to 33 percent. 
However, the reality is, most of the children cannot even obtain that 
reduced target marks (interview #7).  
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The head teacher in conversation revealed:  
Although, many of the low achievers, who do not perform well, are not 
relinquished from the benefit rather, out of compassion, many of them 
are given grace marks to keep up their entitlement and the benefit 
(interview #8). 
This quote supports the teacher’s claim that most of the PESP receiving children are not 
getting a minimum education, which is one of the major objectives of this intervention. 
The head teacher also explained: 
These low achieving children are just increasing enrolment figures of the 
school in exchange of PESP money (interview #8). 
The above findings are consistent with other studies and support the weak targeting and 
‘lightness’ of the conditionality of the PESP. For example, Hossain (2009) argued that the 
school often “adjusts” the eligibility criteria and school attendance records to ensure that 
“deserving” students receive the PESP. On the other hand, to sustain the same percentage 
of students to receive the stipend, school leavers and low achievers are usually replaced by 
comparatively less poor and high achiever children of the class. As a result, many of the 
low achieving children, eligible for the PESP money, are not getting the benefit, as they 
cannot fulfil the conditions (Hossain, 2010).  
The data suggested that the teacher was initially concerned in selecting the PESP 
beneficiaries who were poor children, which was a primary criterion for the programme. 
However, as time goes by, it becomes easier for the teacher to exclude poor children who 
fail to meet the performance criteria. This indicates that the PESP uses the first criteria of 
poverty for ensuring the enrolment of poor children and second criteria of performance for 
excluding the poor and some low performing children.  As a result, around 43.4 percent of 
the children enrolled from the two poorest quintiles do not receive the stipends, whereas 
24.4 percent of children from the two richest quintiles do obtain the benefit (WB, 2008). 
As a consequence, the conditionality permits other rich children to access the PESP 
resource and without banning conditionality the PESP system cannot but help children 
from privileged backgrounds (Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Rumberger, 2010). 
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5.9 Charging other fees from PESP money 
Parents, in general, see the deduction of the PESP money as a punitive measure for not 
fulfilling the conditions. A mother of a school leaver child noted in the interview:       
The school is now swindling with us. It is giving us the money with one 
hand and taking it away by another hand (interview #5). 
The parent also complained against teachers for charging other fees in the name of book 
transportation costs, sports fees, and fees for observing various national days. A mother of 
one school leaver child alleged: 
We had to contribute to stump up community teachers’ salary too 
(interview # 5). 
This indicates that the excess private cost of education annoyed the parent. In reply to my 
question regarding such deduction for community teacher’s salary, the head teacher said: 
This school has employed a community teacher to handle big class size 
in the lower grades. All the teaching staffs, in concurrence with the 
school management committee, introduced this system by convincing 
the local education authority in support of such provision. Initially, the 
plan was that the money would be stumped up from the rent that the 
school would earn from a commercial building constructed in its own 
land and rented out to some businesspersons flanking to the school. 
However, due to the problem with the tenants, the school is unable to 
pay the salary of that community teacher from its own source. Therefore, 
we decide to collect the money from PESP receiving families (interview 
#8).  
 
5.10 Soaring private cost of education 
The head teacher perceived that the role of PESP money was to increase spending ability 
of poor parents on education. According to her:  
The government is paying stipend money to meet the cost of education, 
including the cost of the private tutor (interview # 8).  
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This is not only a perception of the teacher, rather, all the parents informed me that the 
PESP money should be spent on children’s education, especially on private tutoring that is 
what they had been instructed by the school. This misperception increases the private costs 
of education by competitive spending on private tutoring. A mother of a low achiever girl 
said: 
The family, which has the ability, are employing more than one teacher 
and some are providing one teacher for each subject (interview #6). 
This, in turn, increases the cost of education, enhances competition among the households 
phenomenally, and reduces teacher’s sympathy for the poor and low-performing children 
with less private investment. A mother of a school leaver boy stated that she spent more 
than 100 taka per month on her child’s private tutoring. According to her:  
Most of the families, those who are very poor and receiving PESP 
money, like us, are spending more than 100 taka per month as private 
tuition fees. The stipend money alone cannot meet only one-third of the 
amount we spend per month for my child’s education (interview # 5).  
Thus, demand for education is influenced by the family’s expectation from their children 
as well as their ability to meet the systemic seepage of provisioning extra private tutoring 
costs (Laugharn, 2001). The parents alleged that the private spending increased 
tremendously due to the provision of the PESP money and they felt excessive pressure 
from the teacher to employ private tutors to sustain the PESP benefit.  The teacher on the 
other hand, complained that the families are not spending PESP money on their children’s 
education.  
From the study, it seems that the major cause for unequal household resource allocation for 
children’s education is the cost of private tutoring. The mother of the school leaver boy 
stated as follows:  
We cannot afford one private tutor, but other people are sending their 
children to three to four private tutors at a time. Can our child do like 
theirs (interview #5)?  
Through this question, the mother actually raised another important question of social 
inequality and class differences and impact of this inequality on children’s education. The 
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apparent assertion is that the wealth influences access to education and the implicit 
question is; should it be at this early stage of schooling? The mother put forward the point 
very poignantly: 
We know that teacher’s responsibility is to teach all of their students in 
the school. However, the reality is that they do not help our children to 
learn, as we don’t send them for private tutoring. We cannot afford 
private tutors and so our children will not learn. This is the reality 
(interview #5). 
This was the direct allegation made by the mother of school leaver boy. When this mother 
of school leaver child was indicating the school and the teacher, she was maintaining 
‘they’ and the poor people as ‘us’. It suggests to the fact that she was assuming the teachers 
under ‘they’, as educated and well-off community and ‘us’ as poor and illiterate people and 
the PESP money failed to transform ‘us’ into ‘they’; or dream into reality.   
5.11 Enhanced enrolment and attendance 
One immediate effect of the PESP is the number of first generation learners who enters 
primary schools. According to the head teacher: 
The only positive aspect of the PESP is that poorer children are now 
coming to the school and without the money many of these poor families 
may not send them to the school (interview #8). 
The teacher and head teacher of this school informed me that the attendance rate of this 
school went up due to the PESP benefit. According to the head teacher:   
The single benefit that the stipend programme has wrought in the 
schooling system is the regular attendance of the children (interview # 
8).  
However, a mother of a school leaver child reported:  
It is my duty to send the child to the school; I am not sending my child to 
the school for PESP money. Since the government is paying the stipend 
money for the poor children and since we are the poor, we are taking the 
benefit. It does not mean that without the money, I would not send my 
child to the school (interview #1).  
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On the other hand, some very poor families seem to still need the PESP support or, at least, 
it motivates them to send their children to school in order to get the money. One mother of 
such a school leaver child said: 
The PESP money initially attracted me for sending my son to this 
school, but it went in vain due to the school and my child’s low brain 
capacity (interview #5).    
It appears from the discussion that the very poor families with little or no education 
consider PESP benefit and free books as a strong motivation for selecting a government 
primary school. The mother of a school leaver boy commented: 
We chose the government primary school since we will be getting the 
free book. It relief my spending on books and we will also get the ‘PESP 
card’ from the school to pay private tuition fee (interview #5). 
This indicates that the PESP benefit is still a motivation for some poor families for sending 
their children to the school.  
5.12 Politicisation of School Management Committee (SMC) 
Hossain (2009) found in her study that the SMC chairpersons were often members of the 
local elite, with political careers to nurture. This politicisation of the SMC is now 
formalized in the primary education system by the fact that one of the SMC members is 
always nominated by a local Member of Parliament (MP). Accordingly, one of the 
committee members in the case study school has recently been selected by the local MP of 
the ruling party and this member is in effect the guiding force of the committee’s activities. 
Due to his connections with the ruling party, this member is much more influential than the 
chair of the SMC and controls the entire decision-making process. A teacher noted:   
This politically employed person is influencing PESP beneficiary 
selection process and now the committee is recommending many non-
poor children and teachers have to accept those (interview #7). 
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5.13 The PESP distribution process 
The head teacher and teacher unequivocally put forward disbursement of PESP money as 
an ordeal for the whole school staff. They see the payment day as a horrendous day for 
teachers as well as for the parents since 300 parents come to the school at the same time to 
receive the benefit. The teacher spoke out in the interview session: 
It is a huge task to prepare three sets of disbursement documents which 
need checking all the children’s attendance records for the last three 
months (interview #7).  
It was reported that the teacher had to carry out a huge amount of administrative 
responsibilities at the disbursement date other than preparation of distribution documents.  
The teacher noted this as follows:  
On the disbursement date, bank officers come to the school with their 
documents and the mothers need to put signatures on three different sets 
of paper, and we need to countersign on it. It is a huge job to get nine 
hundred signatures from three hundred parents where many of whom 
cannot do the job well (interview #7). 
It is understandable that 300 rural mothers, most of whom are illiterate or semi-literate, 
putting signatures on three sets of papers under the guidance of 10 teachers with accuracy 
is a difficult task. The teacher explained the task of disbursement of PESP money as a very 
complicated task and the school remained closed for that day. According to the teacher:   
This is a ‘complex process’ and lots of efforts, energy, and time the 
teachers need to invest in preparing these documents. Above all, when 
parents get the truncated amount of money, some of them become very 
furious and get into skirmishing (interview #7). 
The ‘complex process’ includes maintenance of the appropriateness of the documents as 
well as keep up a “lightness” of the conditionality. This lightness requires lots of accurate 
calculations and recalculation of the attendance, and achievements related information 
about the children.  
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5.14 PESP policy preference  
According to the policy, a poor family gets 100-taka stipend money for one child and for 
two children the family receives 125 taka if both of them enrol in the same primary school 
(Baulch, 2010). The policy is subject to the criticism that it discourages sending two 
children to the same primary school as it pays only an additional 25 TK. for the second 
child. Whereas, both the direct and opportunity cost of education for the family with two 
children is much higher. Nevertheless, the policy was not maintained in this school and in 
three cases (one school leaver, one low achiever, and one primary school completed child’s 
family); the parents alleged that they did not get 125 taka for two children. On the other 
hand, while one of two children left the school, the second child of the same poor family 
was not awarded the PESP money. The mother of the boy who left school stated:  
When my boy was expelled, I went to the school and requested the 
teachers to allocate the ‘card’ for my daughter who was studying grade 
one in the same school, but the teacher did not pay heed to my appeal 
(interview #1).  
The head teacher responded on this issue:  
The policy of this school is to cover more families in the benefits; 
poverty is not the first consideration in allocating the PESP money 
(interview # 8).   
Although, it is a gross violation of rules, there is nobody to challenge the decision and the 
monitoring system of the government does not pick this up. On the other hand, due to the 
lack of participation in the decision-making process, poor people are unable to claim the 
benefit as their right. The teachers and school management committee along with the 
school authority thus divert the resources to non-poor.  
5.15 Summary 
The findings presented in this chapter inform my first research question: what do parents; 
teacher and head teacher see as the strengths and weaknesses of the PESP implementation 
process in enhancing demand for education.  The discussion below reflects how the 
programme operates and how it satisfies its objectives.   
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The data suggest that the school catchment area is demarcated for assuming responsibility 
to the government primary school to bring all the children to the school in that catchment 
area. The poor families who live in the catchment area and do not send their children to the 
school have provided the PESP money to compensate their direct and opportunity cost and 
motivates them to keep their children in the school. However, the study suggests that the 
government primary school does not serve all the children, rather many other schools are 
operating in the same catchment area. Many poor families prefer to send their children to 
those non-government schools which have no PESP facility. It implies the PESP cannot 
satisfy educational needs of all the poor families and it fails to create effective demand 
among the target group. While, the policy of providing all the catchment area with the 
same proportion of PESP benefit emerges as a problem for very poor catchment areas. This 
means, the equal amount of PESP beneficiary selection from all school catchment areas, 
irrespective of its economic vibrancy and food security status, may leave some needy 
people compared to less poor people in other comparatively well off school catchment 
areas.  
The study reveals that the unwarranted interference of the SMC comes in two different 
ways. One is the traditional social power relations, network, habitus and influences of 
capital as described by Bourdieu (1977) and another is through the introduction of political 
appointment of an SMC member by the local Member of the Parliament (MP). Due to 
good connection with the ruling party, this political selectee influences the PESP selection 
process duly and unduly. The study highlights that all the very poor families get the PESP 
benefit at the entry level and none of the very poor respondents alleges their initial 
exclusion from the process. However, when the selection from the upper tier of the poor 
families is called into question, the data shows both the parents of primary school 
completed children influenced the selection process. It means, relatively less vulnerable 
families use their social network as well as their personal habitus, and dispositions to get 
and secure the benefit. Although, it seems the beneficiary selection process is fairly 
unbiased, however from second through fifth grades, many of the very poor children are 
found to lose their PESP benefit to the non-poor and high achieving children.  
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To prevent the system loss in different tiers of food distribution, the government of 
Bangladesh introduced the cash for education provision. However, the study shows the 
teacher is against this cash transfer process for two basic reasons. First, because it creates a 
universal attraction to money and everyone wants to get it. Second, their personal 
involvement during the distribution time tends to create face to face wordy altercations 
with the parents. The present study reveals that the cash for education programme becomes 
more expensive than food for education programme due to its huge diversion to the non-
poor families.  
The study shows the inadequacy of PESP money has lost its appeal to the poor families as 
a significant contributor to their children’s education. The conditionality of PESP, on the 
other hand, plays a key role to allow high-achieving non-poor children to the PESP benefit. 
All these infiltration of rich families, deduction of the PESP money and antagonistic 
attitudes of the teachers drives out very poor and low achievers from the benefit as well 
from the school. The conditionality also dampens the morale of the poor children as they 
think their substandard mental ability to achieve only bare minimum pass marks (33 
percent) in compared to others. There is a provision for deducting money from the PESP 
(other than unmet conditionality reasons) which has been criticized by the parents. 
Recruitment of community teachers with the PESP money is such an unethical example 
and employing these low-cost and untrained community teachers to the lower grades is 
damaging children’s education. The study also reveals that the poor families do not get the 
extra 25 taka for their second child who attend the same school or who later enrol in the 
school. This happens basically to spread the PESP benefit to most families which may be a 
good intention, however, the very poor families who need more support for sending two 
children to the school are being deprived for the system. The most important issue here is 
that the poor people who are subject to deprivation of this system cannot stand against the 
rule as the whole society supports this practice. The parents allege that the PESP invites 
higher private spending as the teachers encourage them to spend their PESP money on 
private tutoring. Now, the whole community is in the competition to get better 
performance by investing more capital and the PESP is partly responsible for it. The 
utilisation of the PESP benefit of relatively well-off children creates inequality in the 
society. The non-poor households are spending four times as much on private tuition in 
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comparison to poor households in effect improving their chance of completion and 
progression (Al-Samarrai, 2007a). The present study has given a deeper understanding of 
the mechanism and the sociology of redistribution of the PESP resources and the reasons 
for social acceptance for it. Teachers are getting incentives to teach poorly and earning 
extra money through private tutoring and part of the money is coming from the PESP. 
Parents usually come to terms with the ‘tutoring’ seeing as their children’s inability to ask 
questions in the classroom what is possible during private tutoring (Nath and Chowdhury, 
2009). Thus, the PESP money spelled lots of unwanted concepts and practices which 
excluded many poor children who could not afford it. 
This unfair distribution of PESP benefits has created a perpetual value system in the 
society where genuinely qualified families are taking their ineligibility for granted. Over 
and above, the society is accepting good students’ entitlement of the resource irrespective 
of economic background as time goes by. This acceptance of good students’ greater access 
to the PESP benefit is legitimizing the illegal distribution of the PESP resources and 
accepting the role of the school in the social separation processes. Therefore, weaknesses 
of the PESP are not only in the implementation process, rather it is embedded in the 
conceptual ambiguity in giving the responsibility of maintaining conditions of the PESP on 
the families rather than the school. The strategy of allowing well-off and good children 
with PESP benefits in the higher classes of primary school is demoralizing and 
discouraging poor children of their ability to progress to the higher grades. The PESP 
benefit is a kind of “non-cognitive reward” to the poor children at the same time it is 
awarded to the rich and meritorious children for their cognitive ability (Bowles and 
Ginties, 2002). Interestingly, none of the stakeholders, including parent, teacher, and the 
head teacher put forward so much about the strengths of the PESP implementation process 
although they were invited to speak on this issue.   
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CHAPTER 6: EFFECTS OF PESP ON CLASSROOM CULTURE AND 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT  
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the impact of the PESP on the classroom teaching and learning 
process as well as on the relationship between school and community in general and the 
beneficiary parents in particular. Thus, this chapter answers the second research question 
of the present study. The findings discussed below emerge from the interactions with the 
teacher, head teacher, and parent groups during the fieldwork, most of which concerned the 
negative impact of the PESP. This chapter presents 10 themes arising from the data 
analysis process (discussed in detail in the chapter 5) and answers the second research 
question of the present study: how does the PESP influence classroom teaching-learning 
and school processes? 
6.2 PESP attracts underage children 
One of the negative impacts of the PESP, mentioned by both the teacher (s) and parents, is 
age incongruence in the classroom. The official age of entry at grade 1 is six in 
Bangladesh. It is expected that the children will be promoted to Grade 2 in the following  
year at the age of seven and in  subsequently move to Grade 3 at the age of eight and so on. 
However, due to the PESP, this official age of entry and progression and promotion to the 
next grade has not been implemented as intended. This is partly because poor families feel 
they are entitled to have the PESP benefit irrespective of the age of their children and send 
them to the school one year earlier. In many cases, this prevents children from meeting the 
conditions for progression to the next grade due to their unequal developmental stage with 
other children. The mother of a low performing girl said:  
I enrolled my daughter a year earlier than the official age of enrolment. 
Many other parents are also sending their children to the school at the 
age of five to get the PESP money (interview #6).   
The statement reflects the fact that she is aware of sending her child at an early age. She 
also indicated that other parents acted similarly. Another low achiever girl was also 
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enrolled at an early age due to her mother’s enthusiasm for seeing her as a doctor in future 
and got early educational support from the school.  These findings suggest that there may 
be many underage children in the classroom. The mother of a school leaver boy also 
enrolled her son one year earlier than the official age of entry. On the other hand, a mother 
of a school leaver boy reported that she enrolled her son a year later than the official age 
because of his slow physical growth. She said: 
My son looked very small at the age of six. He grew in a very slow space 
and I thought he would not become normal. Therefore, I did not enrol 
him at the age of six. However, when he was seven, he started to grow 
again and I enrolled him in the school (interview # 5).   
This reveals the important role that health and nutrition play in children’s delayed 
enrolment (Ghuman et al. (2006). This study shows that 3 out of 4 school leavers and low 
achieving children repeat in the same grade once in their schooling period. Another study 
on 511 households in rural Bangladesh also reports similar findings where more than one-
third of the PESP receiving children are found in the wrong age group (Baulch, 2010). 
Research shows that the effect of being the oldest child in the cohort is generally estimated 
to yield between 10-27 percent standard deviation higher test scores than the youngest 
child (Strom, 2004, cited by Sprietsmaa, 2008). Accordingly, teachers usually grapple with 
this wide age-range of children in the classroom, which often results in higher rates of 
grade repetition for some children. To reduce wide age range in enrolment, some NGOs 
like BRAC have established pre-primary schools to enrol 5 years old children from poor 
families. This study indicated that children who had a chance to be enrolled in pre-primary 
school progressed well in the primary school. The mother of the primary school completed 
boy claimed: 
I enrolled my boy in the BRAC pre-primary school and there he 
completed one year’s course. After completion of one year pre-primary, 
I enrolled him in this primary school in grade one (interview #3). 
This indicates that families which enrol their children in a pre-primary school show 
increased levels of performance later.  
81 
The mother of a primary school graduate girl said that she enrolled her daughter in the 
school at the right age. In both these cases, mothers enrolled their child at age 6 in grade 1 
and the children transited to secondary school successfully. In contrast, those who enrolled 
their children early (three children) or late (one child) tended to experience a lower 
performance level for their children. Thus, children who enter earlier or whose progress is 
delayed by repetition become over aged, and perform less well than those who enter at the 
correct age. A teacher interviewee expressed the problem as follows:  
A large proportion of underage children come from relatively low-
income families. These underage children attend the school 
intermittently and perform worse and most of them are PESP 
‘cardholders’ (interview #7). 
 
6.3 ‘Un-trainable’ learner 
In most cases, the teacher and head teacher complained about the low “school readiness” 
of poor children in relation to homework preparation, understanding the subject matter, and 
obeying teachers’ behests.  According to the teacher: 
Poor children usually come to school without minimum preparation 
because parents at home do not give them smallest amount of support. 
As a result, these ‘un-trainable’ children usually break the rules in the 
classroom (interview #7).       
This quote suggests that PESP beneficiary families fail to meet teacher’s expectation. It 
also suggests that teacher wants children to be prepared at home so that they can practice 
appropriate behaviour in the classroom settings, thus creating a good learning environment. 
However, the teacher and head teacher frequently complained about the lack of such 
support from the PESP receiving families. Although, this was not claimed to be a direct 
result of the PESP, teachers attribute these problems to the programme indirectly. The 
claim is poor children do not get school readiness training at home as usually wealthy 
children receive from their parents and relatives. The teacher considers the PESP is 
responsible for attracting these poor and ‘un-trainable’ learners to the school that hampers 
classroom teaching and learning process and quality education as a result.   
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6.4 Discriminatory classroom seating arrangement 
Parents of the PESP receiving children see the classroom organization as a barrier to 
learning for poor PESP beneficiary children. A mother of a low achiever girl says:  
Due to large class size, our children sit in the backbench and remain 
unnoticed (interview #4).  
Parents of the PESP receiving children indirectly attribute the fact that their children are 
usually placed at the back of the classroom, to the programme. As one of the mothers of a 
low performing girl put it:  
I went to the school to exhort the teacher to place my child in the front 
bench and once or twice, I went to the classroom and placed my 
daughter on the front bench. I also advised other girls who usually sit in 
the backbench with my daughter to sit in the front bench so that they 
might get teachers’ attention, but it did not work. According to the norms 
of the classroom, my daughter along with other poor children relapsed 
into hind areas of the classroom (interview #4). 
However, this pattern does not equally apply to talented poor children who receive the 
PESP money. According to the mother of one primary school completed boy:  
Those children who are good at study usually sit in the front bench and 
my child never sits in the last bench (interview #3). 
This reflects the fact that high achievers usually sit in the first bench. The mother of 
primary school completed girl reported that her daughter faced huge resistance from other 
students as well as teachers to accommodate her in the front bench. The mother of school 
completed girl stated: 
While my girl was in grade one, once the teacher said, what did you eat, 
grass? The teacher indicated my daughter’s head is full of cow dung. 
The teacher ordered my daughter to sit in the backbench. At that day I 
replied, sir, there may be a fire under the ash. Later the teacher realized 
and placed her permanently in the front bench (interview #2).  
This story represents one girl who was able, and the teachers named her as a successful 
PESP beneficiary child. Most of the poor PESP receiving children are placed in the 
backbench but some of them have broken such norm due to their better performance.  
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Seating can have an important effect on learning. A study of two elementary schools in 
Brazil shows a significant association between student performance and seating position. 
Students sitting near the blackboard perform significantly better than those do sit at the 
back (Tagliacollo, et al, 2010). In this respect, this study added support to the findings 
from the study by Ngware, et al (2013).  
6.5 Inviting versus unfriendly classroom environment 
The mothers of school leavers and low learning children stated that they were dissatisfied 
with the classroom culture and blamed teachers for their children’s low learning levels. 
One of the mothers stated:   
Where children feel comfort, enjoy their participation, and explore new 
knowledge is the best classroom environment, but my child does not 
want to go to the school. What my child say you know, “I shall not go to 
this school, let me admit into any other school”, does not it raise the 
question of the quality of the classroom environment, quality of teachers 
(Interview #1).  
Her comments suggested that the classroom environment negatively affected her child’s 
learning in the classroom. The quote also suggests a difference of view among parents and 
teacher concerning the benefit of the PESP in relation to their children’s performance. A 
friendly and congenial school environment and the warm parental relationship are 
important to ensure children’s participation in the classroom. However, parents and teacher 
(s) indicated a lack of such a situation. The head teacher specifically blamed the PESP 
beneficiary children for a negative classroom environment. According to her:    
The PESP receiving children in general are scary, whenever they are 
asked to study; they panic, and try to memorize without understanding. 
This in many cases perplexes us (Interview #8).  
This suggests that the children are too psychologically stressed to grasp the classroom 
teaching and understandably, the PESP money is one of the reasons they are under duress 
to perform a desirable level, both from the classroom teachers and from the parents at 
home. A lack of which, they know, would start a permanent commotion and skirmishing 
between school and family, and they become the target of that attack. This scary and 
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fearful thinking impacts negatively on the spontaneity of the poor children and creates an 
artificial and uncongenial classroom environment for them.    
Equity in education aims at creating equal opportunity for different groups of children in 
the classroom. Creating equal opportunity requires equal learning opportunity in the 
classroom as well as in extra-curricular activities in the school. School planning can create 
and maintain an equitable learning environment for all children where poor children can 
have additional educational support and services (NREL, 1997, Levin, 2003). However, 
the teacher and head teacher admitted that they could not ensure equity in learning. 
According to the teacher: 
Due to lack of pre-planned activities and large class size, the classroom 
environment never becomes congenial to learning for poor children. We 
cannot take extra care for the poor children (interview #7).  
It is clear from the statement that the teacher feels that additional attention and care are 
required for poor and first generation learners with PESP money. However, it is not in the 
PESP policy that could help the teacher receive extra training and motivation to create a 
favourable classroom teaching and learning environment for these first generation learners.   
6.6 Crowded classrooms  
In Bangladesh, the average teacher-student ratio in the government primary school is 1:46 
and the average class size is 55 (GOB, 2011e). However, the study school shows much 
higher amount of students in the classroom. The head teacher claimed that the PESP was 
responsible for such huge class sizes. She opined:  
In our school, 65-70 students are reading in a classroom in general and I 
think the PESP is responsible for the so big classroom (interview #8). 
The teacher also provided a similar reason regarding overcrowded classrooms:  
The PESP has created ‘extra pressure’ on this already crowded school. 
Now we can fulfil less than 50 percent of children’s learning needs. If 
there were no PESP, the children could achieve more (interview # 7). 
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This ‘extra pressure’ is related to the inability of the teachers to pay equal attention to 
everybody in such a big classroom during teaching. The head teacher was vocal against the 
introduction of the PESP and asserted:   
More children in the classroom do not mean more access to education. 
We cannot follow standardized teaching learning process due to a huge 
number of students and cannot assess them all for remedial teaching due 
to time constraints. The PESP gives us children but the authority does 
not tell us how to manage them (interview #8).  
This quote suggests that teachers and head teachers hold a negative view about the role of 
the PESP in regards to increasing class size and the bad impact this has on learning.  
6.7 Inadequate learning materials  
Data from the current study suggests that both the poor and the PESP receiving children 
face a shortage of learning materials. One of the major objectives of the PESP is to 
subsidize the purchase of learning materials. However, for several reasons, this does not 
happen. The teacher, head teacher, and parents all noted that the poor and PESP receiving 
children in general have an inadequate number of ‘books’. Interestingly, these ‘books’ 
represent guidebooks and notebooks excluding textbooks which are freely supplied by the 
government. The mother of a school leaver boy complained:  
We are not able to buy all the notebooks and guidebooks referred by the 
teachers and so our child cannot do well without those in the classroom. 
How can I buy those expensive books with this little stipend money 
(Interview #5)?    
The teacher and head teacher also criticized the PESP beneficiaries for not ensuring 
adequate learning materials for their children. They also blamed the parents for not 
spending all the PESP money on learning materials. According to the head teacher:  
Many of the PESP receiving children attend the school without pen and 
copybooks. They usually lag behind the others and PESP money fails to 
ensure their participation in the classroom activities (interview #8).   
The head teacher alleged that most of the parents do not use the PESP money for education 
purposes. The data indicate that the PESP recipients face a shortage of learning materials 
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in the classroom compared to wealthier children and this hamper their participation in 
classroom activities.   
6.8 Low expectation of teachers 
Equity in attitude is important in bringing about equity in education. The children who 
come from the lower socioeconomic stratum deserve extra care and attention from teachers 
as well as a belief that all children have the ability to succeed. The teacher in the interviews 
expressed her belief that poor PESP receiving children were not capable of enhancing their 
performance compared to wealthier children. This view contradicts the belief of equality 
independent of wealth or background. It also did not support the learning of marginalized 
children. The teacher stated:  
I do not think PESP money can improve classroom teaching and ensure 
all children’s learning rather it is dependent on parental awareness and 
their ability to invest in children’s education (interview #7).  
This suggests that teachers do not expect PESP beneficiaries to perform well since their 
parents are not able to spend the required amount of money for their children. This low 
expectation results in a negative attitude towards poor PESP families and their children’s 
education. However, some studies suggest that social status and economic privileges are 
not reproduced by the genetic inheritance of IQ; but rather by the environment (Bowles 
and Nelson, 1974; Tucker-Drob, et al. 2011). Besides, in the determination of human 
intelligence, genetics and environment appear to interact, with environmental factors and 
culture playing an important role (Stuppia, et al. 2010). This current study shows  some 
poor children in this school, do  perform better than other school leaving children  and low 
achieving children from similar equal socioeconomic backgrounds and their class positions 
(roll number in the class) can be better than other wealthier children. This demonstrates 
that poor children can achieve increased levels of performance if the school culture and 
home environment work together.  
6.9 PESP and corporal punishment 
Ahmed et al., argue that a teachers’ normal expectation is that all students will achieve 
most of their learning at home (from private tutor) and teachers will guide them and correct 
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their homework in the school (2005). It is true that the children from the lower 
socioeconomic background are more vulnerable in the classroom as a result of the limited 
support they receive at home and the absence of learning materials. It is expected that all 
these inadequacies be taken into consideration by the teacher during the teaching and 
learning process to bring them out and participate in learning. This current study illustrates 
that mothers of a PESP beneficiary boy and a beneficiary girl who have completed primary 
education were satisfied with the classroom teaching processes. However, mothers of 
school leaver and low achiever children who have lost the PESP benefit alleged that the 
teachers usually dealt with their children heavy-handedly in the classroom and referred 
them as ‘bad students’. A mother of a school leaver child explained:  
The teachers used to beat the child, castigate him, insult him by keeping 
him standing up holding ear by hand, and putting his head on the bench 
or in his own thighs at times. All these abuses and inhuman punishments 
have broken my child’s heart and now he is unwilling to attend this 
school (interview #1). 
This child was branded by the teacher as ‘incorrigible’ and expelled from the school and 
his mother was looking forward to enrolling him in some ‘soft religious school’, where 
there was limited corporal punishment and less academic pressure. It seems that the school 
inflicts corporal punishment to increase attention and attainment on the PESP beneficiary 
children. A mother of another school leaver boy said:  
My son does not go to school in fear of whacking. Once when my child 
fails to respond to a question of a teacher, she beat him so severely the 
boy terrifies and miss the school for several days. Yes, I have given my 
child to you to learn and you have every right to discipline him, but 
should not there be a limit for that? It is true that you are paying stipend 
money for my child, but how much can you beat for that little amount 
(Interview # 5)?  
The study reveals that teachers are under pressure to ensure that the performance of the 
PESP beneficiaries is adequate to sustain the receipt of the stipend as per the conditions. 
They prefer corporal punishment as a strategy to motivate children to pay more attention in 
the classroom and spend more time on their studies at home.  
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However, a mother of a low achiever girl reported that beating was the reason for her 
daughter’s low motivation:  
My daughter was not so bad at the study and did well in the early grades 
(grades 2 & I) in spite of our abject poverty. However, when she was 
promoted to grade three, it seemed to me that she felt the study rather 
burdensome. Once she came home crying and said that she would not go 
to school anymore because the teacher beat her severely in front of 
others. After that day, my daughter became irregular in the school, 
inattentive in the study and in cases, she even turned down her father’s 
behest to study at home or go to the school (interview #6). 
To evade corporal punishment, some of the PESP beneficiary children do not attend school 
timely and regularly. According to a teacher:  
Presently, many of the children, mostly PESP holders and low achievers, 
leave the school during lunch break but do not come back in the 
classroom after the break (interview #7).  
The head teacher also stated:  
Overall, school attendance has increased due to the PESP but during 
school hour, some of these children are resorting truancy to mask low 
performance and to evade punishment (interview #8). 
This indicates that children attend the school just to record their attendance, as it is a 
requirement for receiving the PESP grant. However, they are not interested in staying in 
the classroom rather they play in the village or roam on the bank of river with other school 
leavers and come back home after school hour. This suggests that physical access as a 
condition for the PESP is emphasized over learning.  
6.10 Undermine teachers 
The teacher and head teacher mentioned that arguments with parents occurred almost every 
day regarding the PESP and this impacted negatively on the learning environment and the 
management of the school.  
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The teacher said:   
The impact of the PESP on school management is far reaching. Most of 
the teachers of this school are tormented with the stipend programme. 
Almost every day some kinds of problem and issues the teachers have to 
face related to this PESP (interview #7).  
The teacher asserted: 
The PESP beneficiary parents come to the school for trivial reasons and 
cannot behave well. They used to implicate teachers in thieving the 
PESP money in front of students. This damages the morale of teachers 
and affect classroom teaching negatively (interview #7).     
This type of conflict resulted in a deterioration of the teacher-student relationship in the 
classroom. Mutual respect and trust is the key to success for facilitating children’s 
learning. However, lack of such mutual trust and respect due the PESP distribution debate 
demoralised teacher to pay equal attention and take adequate care for all children and the 
children whose parents were involved in wordy altercation suffered most. This essentially 
inhibited equity in classroom teaching and learning process which requires more support 
for the low performing children from the teacher. This inequality in classroom teaching 
and learning is growing due to the unfair denunciation of the teacher regarding PESP 
money misuse.               
6.11 Inadequate class time  
A mother of a school leaver boy identified weaknesses of the classroom evaluation process 
as one of the major problems of learning. She said:  
How can a school teach better where so many students in a classroom? 
One madam enters and exit and another madam come in. What a child 
can learn within this short period of time? How many children can 
prepare their study and how many of them can be assessed in this short 
period? What will you (the teacher) understand good and bad in this time 
(interview #5)?  
Although, this is not directly blaming the PESP but indirectly she alleges that the poor 
children become victims of any adverse classroom situation. This mother is an illiterate 
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woman, but observed and indicated a key problem of the classroom teaching. The head 
teacher also similarly noted: 
In this school, average class size is 60-65 and the class time is only 40 
minutes. Therefore, the teacher cannot allow enough study time for the 
children to prepare their lessons in the classroom and the teacher cannot 
evaluate student’s achievement by asking them individually, which 
allow some student’s unpreparedness on the issues each day and on each 
subject area (interview #8).  
This suggests that teachers cannot regularly assess and monitor children’s learning 
achievement. They indirectly blamed the PESP money for the inadequacy. A mother of a 
school leaver boy posited a relationship between the PESP for this participation and low-
quality education. She stated:    
The poor families that have turned down the PESP benefit and enrol 
their children in the NGO school to get ‘good’ education. However, we 
are unable to relinquish the PESP benefit, enrol our children in this 
school, and now getting low-quality education compared to them 
(interview #5).  
This suggests that she has relinquished the expectation of a quality education for the PESP 
benefit. The PESP enhances enrolment, but this does not improve the quality of education. 
One of the major objectives of the PESP is to increase the learning achievement of poor 
children (GOB, 2011d). The head teacher and teacher unequivocally mention that the 
PESP receiving children lag behind in learning. The teacher said:  
Most of the children who receive the PESP money come from relatively 
poor families and most of these children lag behind and perform low 
compared to the children who do not get the money (interview #7).  
This quote suggests that the PESP has not resulted in the desired quality education for poor 
children. Another mother of a low achiever girl stated that:  
My child cannot spell out words appropriately, but can read it when I ask 
to read. I guess she recalls it from her memory. She is now reading in 
class three, though should be in grade four, still she cannot recognize all 
the Bangla and English alphabets well (interview #4).  
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This poor performance of the girl is a reflection of poor classroom teaching and learning 
process and poor literacy skills development as a result for most of the children receiving 
the PESP money. The stipend money thus assures physical presence in the school but fails 
to guarantee access to quality education. The following quote by a teacher revealed 
learning exclusion of poor children receiving the benefit:    
We do not have that energy to take individual care of all lagged behind 
students since we are to take 5-6 classes every day, and 20 out of 50 
children lag behind. Most of them are the PESP beneficiaries who cannot 
learn equally and we cannot give them additional time (interview #7).  
While, the parents claim that the school uses the PESP money as a coercive measure to 
control the family, it does not take good care of their children’s learning. A mother of a 
school leaver boy mentioned: 
Whatever happens, the school expects children’s attendance must be 
ensured or else we have to go to school to inform that my sick child will 
not come to school today. The teachers always ask us to push our child 
to study hard at home. Well, what are the teachers’ doing with our 
children in the school? We do not know (interview #5).  
This quote suggests that parents are frustrated about the low performance of their children 
in spite of their regular class attendance. Having experienced such poor performance, the 
parents and teachers have taken for granted poor children’s poor ability to learn and 
believe that poor children usually own less ‘brain’ or it usually remains ‘non-functional’.  
6.12 Conclusion 
The chapter has presented the data which informs the second research question, ‘how does 
the PESP influence classroom teaching-learning and school processes?’ in ensuring quality 
education. The discussion below reflects how the findings fulfil and address my second 
research question.  
The study suggests that many poor families send their children to school a year early in 
order to get the PESP money. This early enrolment creates a multi-aged classroom with 
different developmental needs that hampers normal teaching and learning. This mix-aged 
problem results in repetition for some children and this study found three out of four 
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children who left the school and lost the PESP benefit had repeated the grade. This mixed 
age problem appears to make the teaching and learning process more challenging for the 
teachers and results in low achievement for many. The study found that children who enrol 
at the right age do better than those who enrol one year early. The teacher and head teacher 
alleged that the poor children from the PESP receiving families usually lacked the required 
school readiness and these children are more disobedient. It is expected that the children 
learn some basic rules and regulations and some basic academic skills at home, taught by 
their parents, but the PESP receiving children are usually branded as ‘untrainable’ students.  
One of the objectives of the PESP is to ensure the quality of education for the poor 
children. However, the PESP participant parents, in general, alleged their children’s 
disadvantaged seating position (backbench) in the classroom was a major barrier to their 
learning. One of the mothers tried to break this discriminatory classroom norm, but it 
quickly changed back. Here, social class, capital, and doxa - all worked together to keep up 
with the traditional norms to sustain social hierarchy and equilibrium. The study identified 
an antagonistic relationship between the PESP participant families and the teacher of the 
study school. The reason being, the parents believed their children are not treated or taught 
well in the classroom due to their poor background and lower achievement level.  
The teachers were also disenchanted with the noncooperation of the PESP receiving 
families in terms of taking no care at home and the persistent low performance of those 
children. The lack of adequate training and provisions for additional support services for 
the low achieving children, lack of regular parent teacher formal meeting of the roles and 
responsibility of the parents and, lack of understanding of the needs for home-school 
partnership create mistrust between PESP receiving parents and teachers of the study 
school. The teachers complained of the large class size due to the PESP. However, there is 
no clear instruction from the school authority in terms of how to deal with this 
unmanageable number of children. The teacher acknowledged her limitations in addressing 
only 50 percent of children’s learning needs in the short class time, but rest of the 
children’s learning needs remain unaddressed. The supply side of education in such a way 
becomes weaker day by day and the teacher blamed the PESP, at least in part for this 
problem. The teacher further suggested a cause for the poor performance of the PESP 
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receiving children, in general, is that they suffer from inadequate learning materials. This 
study revealed these learning materials are basically the “notebooks” and “guidebooks” in 
addition to the government’s free textbooks which the school suggests buying from the 
market.  
In some cases, the teacher also mentioned the lack of pen and copybooks which genuinely 
affect children’s learning in the classroom and the PESP money, in some cases, fails to 
ensure learning materials for some children. The teacher’s high expectations are also an 
important factor for student’s learning achievement in the school. However, the head 
teacher and teacher of the study school expressed their belief that poor PESP receiving 
students could not show equal performance as their rich classmates and the PESP money 
could not compensate their inability. This is the common social attitude towards poor 
children’s learning ability and definitely, it has implications for not improving the supply 
of education for the PESP receiving children.  New government policy is in effect, but the 
struggles to improve the supply of education yet to achieve due to the hysteresis effect.  
The study identifies that a complexity is gyrating around the expectation from the PESP 
that complicates the relationship between teacher and student which is unfortunate. In 
some cases, it took the   form of rivalry between the PESP recipient student and the 
schoolteacher since both parties were  humiliated by the family and school authority or 
vice versa regarding low performance and sustaining the benefit. Since, the teachers were 
located at the top of the hierarchy, sometimes they vented their anger by beating PESP 
receiving children who failed to perform well in the school. Sometimes it became 
excessive and in two cases (one school leaver boy and another low performing girl), the 
children left the school as a result of the excessive beating. Some other PESP receiving 
children resorted to truancy in order to evade corporal punishment and some others 
attended school irregularly. On the other hand, the study found that the PESP destroyed the 
teacher’s image in the community due to the continuous clash with the parents about 
misappropriation of deducted PESP money. Allegations of money theft in front of students 
damaged the morale of the teachers which in turn contributed to heavy-handed classroom 
management style or aversion to the PESP receiving children. Parents also alleged that the 
teachers spent very little time on task and assessment of student’s achievement which 
94 
hampered the student’s learning as well as a teacher’s understanding of the student’s 
achievement level. These in effect, contained the supply of quality education for the PESP 
receiving children, although the teachers used the money as a controlling mechanism for 
school attendance.    
This chapter has informed the second research question. The results above indicate that as 
a demand side financing initiative (Patrinos, 2005) the PESP increases demand for 
education in a very limited way. School attendance is increased due to the condition of 
PESP but the teachers show dissatisfaction for large class sizes. The differences in learning 
between PESP and non-PESP children depend on the economic, social, and cultural capital 
of the families and the PESP cannot mitigate such structural socio-cultural inequalities.  
Teachers’ expectations for the poor children are low, and they suffer from contradistinctive 
expectations and the behaviour of the teachers. This discriminatory behaviour and severe 
beating discourage the PESP receiving children to attend the school and results in some 
children achieving low levels of performance, which again attracts more physical 
punishment and verbal abuse. These adverse school conditions and minimum learning 
achievements cause discontinuation of the PESP benefit which ultimately pushes the 
children out of the school. However, this limitation of the supply-side aspect of the PESP 
is hardly discerned by the teachers and head teacher of the study school although the 
parents raise their voice against such unaccountability.  
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CHAPTER 7:    SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The present study has explored the strengths and weaknesses of the PESP in increasing 
demand for and access to quality education for poor children. Bangladesh shows 
phenomenal success in enrolling children and bringing about gender parity in enrolment 
(GOB, 2012). The PESP policy as such is politically regarded as a mechanism by policy 
makers and stakeholders to increase poor children’s access to education. Some studies 
show duplicity in the beneficiary selection process and non-poor families use a significant 
amount of the PESP benefit (Hossain and Zeitlyn, 2010; Tietjen, 2003). However, limited 
previous work has focussed on understanding the effects of the PESP from the perspective 
of beneficiary families. The present study therefore focused on the beneficiaries’ 
perspectives of the policy. This chapter begins with a brief summary of the main findings 
and then discusses implication for policies in different levels, implication for future 
research, personal reflection, and it concludes with a discussion of the significant 
contribution to knowledge.    
7.2 A glance at research questions 
The lack of studies about the perceptions of stakeholders about the role of PESP in 
achieving equitable access to quality education motivated me to undertake this study. In 
order to guide the research the following research questions were developed: 
Research Question 1: What do parents, teacher and head teachers see as the strengths and 
weaknesses of PESP in increasing demand for education? 
Research Question 2: How does the PESP influence teaching-learning and school 
operation processes?  
Concerning the first research question, the evidence suggests a number of barriers to poor 
family’s participation in the PESP have caused divergence between policy and practices 
and influences little on demand for education.    
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7.3 Barriers to increasing demand for education through the PESP   
The role of the PESP is to create a demand for education among the poor families who do 
not send their children to the school. However, this study reveals a number of weakness in 
the programme to create effective demand as discussed below:      
7.3.1 Beneficiary selection 
The present study explored stakeholders’ perceptions of the PESP beneficiary selection 
process and found differing practices within the case study school. The PESP participant 
selection process was influenced mostly by the politicised and biased SMC members 
appointed by the local Member of Parliament (MP). Since, most of the teachers, including 
the head teacher, are outsiders to this community and reside in the nearby town, they know 
little about the beneficiaries and they usually do not stand against any biased decision.    
The comparatively less poor PESP receivers, who have completed primary school 
successfully, request the ‘PESP card’ from the local education authority and members of 
the school management committee. However, the school leavers and low performing 
children’s family got the benefit without request. Both the selections are within the 
regulation but using the network and their social power is predominant for comparatively 
less poor people and they do not see anything wrong with this. This suggests that socio-
political power is used for obtaining the PESP benefits and it is widely accepted by the 
school community. Interestingly, very poor families are not excluded from the initial PESP 
beneficiary selection process, although most of these families cannot keep the benefit 
throughout their primary completion.  
The PESP policy allows two children from one family with a reduced amount of 125 taka 
in spite of 200 taka. In general, the policy is contested as both the opportunity and direct 
costs for the family with two children attending school is higher but instead, they are 
required to accept a reduced amount. However, the rule of providing two children with 
reduced amount or giving PESP benefit to the second child of a family when the first one 
is not in school is not followed in this study school. The mother of a school leaver, a low 
achiever, and a primary school completed child report that teachers persistently refuse the 
additional 25 taka for their second child who also study in the same school. In two cases, 
97 
when their first child left the school, their second child was not included in the stipend 
scheme which is a violation of the PESP policy. Therefore, the existing rules and 
regulations for selecting PESP beneficiary are not maintained properly in this school and 
the respondents report it unhappily.   
7.3.2 Conditionality problem  
There is a conditional and unconditional cash transfer debate around the world. The study 
suggests that due to the unmet conditionality many families receive reduced amounts of 
money. This gives a wrong perception to the parents of their children’s low ability and 
damages the morale of the children who receive a reduced amount of money. Here 
conditions are set to improve school participation and attainment of the children, but not to 
add extra value to the family well-being as oppose to general CCT programme. The aim of 
the CCT programme is to improve material well-being of the target families through 
alleviating poverty and improving nutritional conditions of the households. Here children’s 
school participation is a condition for reaching the CCT benefit. On the other hand, the 
fulfilment of the conditions of PESP benefit (attendance and performance) depends 
basically on the performance of children although families have enough scope to play an 
ancillary role. Therefore, conditionality of the PESP cannot be equated to the conditions of 
the CCT programme.  
This study suggests that conditions of the PESP are being used against poor children by 
penalizing and excluding them from the benefit and allowing other non-poor children to 
access the benefit. The deduction of money due to low attendance creates confusion among 
the PESP beneficiaries who think that the teachers are stealing the deducted amount. Yet 
the teacher and head teacher are not aware of what the government does with the deducted 
amount. This perversion of the conditions of the PESP reduces teacher’s respect in the 
community. Thus, the minimum amount of stipend money, which covers part of the 
opportunity cost of poor families, is caught in the conditionality debates as to whether the 
conditions are helping in improving poor children’s school participation or preventing 
them from receiving the benefit (Rawlings and Rubio, 2003). This case study suggests that 
the PESP in Bangladesh prevents some poor families to get the benefit and allows the 
middle class to exploit the benefit (Besley and Kanbur, 1990).  
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7.3.3 Inadequate PESP money   
The insignificance of the stipend amount is asserted by all the parents and teachers who 
took part in the interview session, and none of the interviewee mothers admitted that the 
PESP money was the primary motivation for their children’s enrolment. All of the parents 
unanimously assert that the amount of the PESP money is too small to make any difference 
to their children’s schooling. Initially, in 2003, the PESP money was more than double the 
present value of the money. It is currently reported as being inadequate for   poor families 
to support their children’s education. It is also evident from the study that the school 
charges other fees directly from the PESP money, like, subscription for observing national 
and religious days, etc., which parents could not appreciate (Baulch, 2010).  
7.3.4 Disbursement dilemma 
The disbursement of the PESP money is a tiresome process involving a significant amount 
of  work for the school to prepare disbursement sheets, check each child’s documents, and 
prepare and maintain disbursement related documents on the day of payment. The most 
challenging aspect of disbursing the PESP money is to deal with the parents who receive 
deducted amount of PESP money and implicate in an altercation. To accommodate 
disbursement related activities and to avoid conflict between parent and teachers, the 
school remains closed for the disbursement day. Although, the school remains closed for 
4/5 days in a year for disbursement purpose, however, the bitterness and tension between 
teachers and parents linger throughout the year.  
The study suggests that the PESP increases teacher and head teacher’s expectations that 
parent will spend some of the money on private tutors.  The data suggest that the head 
teacher and teacher were disappointed with the poor parent’s motivation to engage a 
private tutor. This pressure from teachers results in a competition among the parents for 
engaging tutors resulting in the ‘marketisation’ of education. This increase in the private 
cost of education and lowers the chances for very poor children to access to quality 
education in spite of their access to PESP money.  
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7.4 Impact of the PESP on classroom culture and school processes  
Concerning the second research question, the evidence suggests that the PESP influences 
the school and classroom in different ways and results in a deterioration of the teaching 
and learning environment as well as creates an uncongenial parent-teacher relationship. 
These negative influences of the PESP on classroom environment are presented below.     
7.4.1 Overcrowding classrooms 
The school is caught in the dilemma of accepting high levels of regular attendance due to 
PESP which results in crowded classrooms. The teacher and head teacher note that 
increased enrolment has both a positive and negative impact on the school teaching-
learning processes. It is positive in the sense that a majority of poor children enrol in 
school. The increase in teacher student ratio, due to the PESP, is mentioned as a negative 
effect of the increased enrolment. Overcrowding of classrooms is frequently raised by the 
teacher and head teacher as the main reason for a poor classroom teaching-learning 
environment.  
7.4.2 Attract underage children  
The teachers and parents mention that many underage children are enrolled in the school as 
a result of the PESP. According to the interviewed mothers, three out of four excluded 
children were underage when enrolled in the school and one was overage. This age in 
grade incongruent children creates many problems in the classroom due to their differential 
developmental stages and learning needs, according to the teachers. Very poor parents send 
their children to access their rights to PESP benefit as a poor household. These underage 
children perform less, repeat, and drop out of the system. This suggests the PESP may 
result in some children’s low performance and school exclusion.  
7.4.3 Increase nominal attendance  
The poor PESP benefit-receiving children usually sit in the inaccessible rear part of the 
classroom and do not receive the attention of the teacher. As a result, most of them do not 
learn much. Therefore, to avoid corporal punishment, due to lack of preparation for class 
and homework, many of these low performing children attend only in the first period when 
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the roll call is done and stay absent for rest of the day. This increases nominal attendance 
of the children as per record but most of these PESP benefit-receiving children 
underperform. Teachers have a low expectation from the poor children and it reflects in the 
classroom seat arrangement and questioning of the children, and all these affect the PESP 
beneficiary student’s class performance negatively. As a result, the PESP receiving 
students attend the school but do not engage in classroom activities and get the minimum 
benefit. 
7.4.4 Reduce achievement 
This study shows that the school leavers and children who have lost their PESP benefits 
are low achievers in their classes. The low ability of poor children is depicted as a usual 
scenario by all respondents. The teacher and head teacher state that most of the PESP 
receiving children perform lower than the non-PESP children. It is not directly stated that 
the PESP money results in poor performance, the teacher and head teacher mention that 
they believe that overall performance of the school has declined due to the PESP and poor 
children are suffering most. 
This study shows that the low-performing girls and school leaver boys are unable to 
perform at the minimal level in the classroom in their respective grades. The study also 
reveals that the teachers give extra/grace marks to keep the entitlement sustained. This 
masks the actual achievement of the PESP receiving children. The study suggests that a 
large number of the PESP receiving children cannot complete the primary cycle and a 
significant proportion of them repeat the same grade before leaving school (Hossain, 
2010). These repeaters are dampened with the presentation that they get the stipend for 
their destitution and they only need to achieve a bare minimum mark in the examination. 
This reduces them to the inferiority complexity and the ‘softness’ of the teachers (giving 
pass marks) even limits these children’s confidence by letting them realize their 
insignificance in the hierarchal classroom. Clearly, without support from teachers in the 
classroom, any extrinsic cash for education/PESP cannot ensure quality education for poor 
children.  
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7.5 Deteriorating parent-teacher relationship and school operation and 
management 
This study suggests that the teachers are very concerned about the PESP as it takes lots of 
time in administering the programme and dealing with the conflicts related to the PESP 
selection and distribution process. The teachers feel a loss of energy and motivation due to 
the conflicts about the management of the PESP which affect the classroom environment 
negatively. Parents also feel attitudes of the teachers affect their children’s low level of 
motivation. This increases mistrust among the parents and teachers and they blame each 
other for the low-quality education for poor children. This blame game results in a poor 
relationship between school and parents and negatively affects the learning of the children.   
It appears from the discussion of the two research questions that the programme 
participants (parents, teacher, and head teacher) are not satisfied with the PESP in terms of 
its policy as well as implementation process. Parents do not believe that the PESP policy 
supports their children’s education. Whilst teachers do not believe it is an efficient 
programme that benefits teaching and learning. Both groups blame the PESP for the low-
quality education for the poor and PESP receiving children. This raises the issue of how 
effective and useful this policy intervention is and whether should there be an 
unconditional support for it.    
7.6 The implications of research findings 
The findings of this study have implications for the policy makers and policy 
implementers, both at local and national levels and for the future research.  
7.6.1 Implication for policy  
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) extended the idea of access to education 
requiring the completion of full-cycle of primary schooling by all children by 2015 (GMR, 
2005). This wider international agreement has endorsed the wider concept of access as a 
means to keep children away from child labour and hazardous activities. Secure access to 
and participation in education can only be assured by creating a practical, universal, and a 
humanitarian value system among the children (Cohen and Bloom, 2005; Pigozzi, 2004). 
The role of PESP is to promote equal educational opportunity for all children and to ensure 
102 
quality learning for all children. However, due to the lack of such shared vision, the role of 
the PESP does not result in the secure enrolment of poor children and quality learning for 
them. In this context, the results of this study have future policy implications for the 
school, teachers, students, parents and the PESP.  
Implication for school 
There is a lack of trust and confidence among the school and the community regarding the 
PESP participant selection, management, and disbursement processes. The school should 
inform the parents of the selection criteria of the PESP and any type of negative influence 
of capital or symbolic capital on the selection process as well as on children’s classroom 
participation and performance must be mitigated. A clear-cut policy about deduction of the 
PESP money must be formulated and disseminated clearly among the parents by the 
school. Ascribing rescinded PESP benefit to the non-poor good student is a detrimental 
policy adopted by the school. A school policy to improve poor children’s performance 
level to meet the conditions of the PESP could enhance credibility of the school. 
Confiscating books from the PESP rescinded-children must be avoided to give them a 
chance for a second thought to starting school again; otherwise, it leads to a full stop. 
The school should take appropriate action to address the issue of absence/truancy and low 
achieving children by providing them with adequate academic support by employing 
additional community teachers along with counselling services to enhance their motivation 
level to participate in the classroom activities and perform well. This will reduce the 
repetition rates and reduce the cost of education for poor families by shortening the number 
of years of primary schooling from 6/7 years to normal 5 years for those who repeat 1/2 
times in different grades. Health related problem can cause developmental delay in the 
early life and without addressing such health and other poverty related problems through 
the school health programme, equal school participation for these poor children cannot be 
ensured. It appears from the study that this traditional approach to increasing quality of 
education by offering food or financial incentives to the family cannot be achieved. They 
often treat symptoms of inequality in education such as attendance, but fail to bring about 
equity in learning. The PESP aims at increasing “physical access” of the poor children, but 
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this has little to do with improving school quality and learning of the children. While, this 
PESP should not be treated as a scholarship programme for the best student rather it should 
be used as an equity resource to create a rich school and classroom culture to ensure equal 
opportunity for learning for all children.  A rich school culture is dependent on many other 
extrinsic factors, and all of these aspects of education must be measured from a quality 
perspective. 
Implication for teachers 
The study revealed that the teachers were less involved in the PESP beneficiary selection 
process which implicates the higher role of the SMC and larger deviation in the selection 
process. To ensure proper distribution of the PESP benefit, all the teachers should be 
involved in the PESP beneficiary selection process. The study identifies low expectation of 
the teachers from the PESP benefit-receiving children that demoralises the children and 
lower their confidence level. Permanent placing in the backbench of the poor and PESP 
receiving children is a result of such a disparaging notion shared by both the student and 
teachers. Change in the perception of teachers is needed to allow congenial classroom 
sitting arrangement for the poor children to enhance their learning by means of placing 
them in the front benches at times when requires.  
This study showed poor parent’s concern over teachers’ excesses in the classroom with the 
children who perform poorly. The teachers should treat all the children with caressing and 
caring manner in the classroom irrespective of their background and the PESP receiving 
parents should be given assurance that their children would not be punished. The teachers 
must stop promoting private tutoring by using the PESP money. The teachers should have 
an open discussion with the parents of the PESP receiving children who are supposed to 
get a reduced amount of PESP money and the parents must be informed of the diminution 
criteria properly.  
Implication for parents  
The PESP policy aims at improving demand for education and enhancing the expectation 
level of the poor parents of their children’s education. However, the parents are not 
convinced that the PESP has anything to do with their motivation to send their children to 
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the school. Rather, they think, due to the conditions and teacher’s negative attitudes many 
PESP receiving children are leaving school. Teachers, on the other hand, expect more 
cooperation and support from the parents to improve children’s school readiness and 
developing their amicable behaviour at home. The parents therefore should be a part of the 
school readiness programme where available to bring these differing anticipations together. 
The parents are frustrated by seeing their children’s lowest achievement in their grade 
and/or leaving school which they believe partially due to the PESP. Frequent parent 
teacher meetings can mitigate some of this mutual blame and the parents can play a 
supportive role in their children’s learning. Use of the PESP money has always been an 
issue and the teachers usually blame the parents for not spending all the money on 
children’s education. While, the parents reason that the PESP money is so little that it 
cannot help their children’s education rather they spend more than the money they receive 
per month. It is true that the money itself is not sufficient to make a difference, but the 
parents should consider it as a motivating factor for children’s education and should spend 
the money exclusively on education. On the other hand, the parents should show due 
respect to the teachers to create a good image of them which is a precondition for 
children’s learning. The parents also should keep close contact with the schoolteachers to 
understand their children’s individual learning needs to participate actively in their 
children’s learning.      
The study shows that many of the students are becoming victims of the PESP. Some of the 
parents are sending their children to the school one year early to get the PESP benefit. In 
most cases, these age-in grade incongruent children become the victim of castigation both 
from the part of teachers and from their own parents for not achieving minimum learning 
to keep the PESP benefit sustained. Many of these PESP receiving and low achiever 
children feel alienated from the classroom teaching and learning process and some of them 
resort to truancy to avoid beating and scolding. To avoid all these unwanted consequences, 
parents should be aware of the negative impact of early enrolment.  
Implication for the PESP policy 
For the poor families, the cost of education for more than one child is higher. The study 
reveals that the school is not providing money for the second child, which is a violation of 
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the PESP rule. The education administration should encourage the school to distribute the 
stipend to the poor and disadvantaged families according to the rules. The PESP should be 
taken as a part of equity intervention and it must be integrated into many other conditions 
of equity in education. The conditions are equity in access, equity in resources, equity in 
teachers’ expectation, equity in learning materials, equity in access to the good teacher, and 
equitable transition to secondary school. Without fulfilling these conditions, PESP-money 
alone cannot improve access to quality education for poor children. The local education 
administration, in consultation with the school, should prepare a comprehensive plan to 
improve these equity conditions for PESP receiving children. The PESP aims at providing 
poor children with the necessary learning materials; however, none of the parents in this 
study felt that this is the case. The PESP policy should provide some essential learning 
materials to the PESP receiving children in addition to the direct grant monies.  
 
Conditionality is found to be another weakness of the PESP which result in many poor 
children’s’ losing the stipend and consequently they need to repeat and leave the school. 
The programme should revoke conditions and let all the children continue up to primary 
cycle without the benefit rescinded and the money should go directly to the beneficiary 
mother’s bank account to avoid disbursement related hazards. The study shows that the 
amount of PESP money is insignificant to the poor family to cover monthly costs of 
education, including private tuition fees requires continuing schooling with a minimum 
level of performance. It is therefore important to explore other benefits of the PESP such as 
poverty reduction, improvement in household nutritional level and women’s empowerment 
which are also related to the objective of the PESP to understand the actual effects of the 
PESP. In that case, the PESP should be equated with other social security measures taken 
by the government of Bangladesh to protect the vulnerable group of people and the money 
should not be spent under education budget.  
Looking back at Bourdieu in my work  
I informed in the literature review chapter that my intention was to look into the reality of 
PESP programme participants regarding the impact of the programme on demand and 
supply of education through Bourdieu’s key concepts of habitus, social field, capital, and 
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hysteresis effects. The study shows that due to certain dispositions and defined position in 
the society, newly introduced PESP benefits are not being utilised fully by the poor 
families. According to Bourdieu, habitus is structured by agent’s past and present 
circumstance and the teachers and head teacher identified poor children’s lack of school 
readiness, a big barrier to classroom participation, came from their family’s lower position 
and disposition in the education field. The social field is dominated by those who start with 
a specific form of capital (economic, social, cultural, and symbolic capital) hold better 
position and reproduce more of the capital. The comparatively less poor families are found 
to have used their interpersonal relationship   (social capital) to get access to the PESP 
benefit. The PESP is a sub field of the education field which was created by the 
government to change the fundamental beliefs or accepted assumption (doxa) that poor 
children cannot progress well in the education field. However, the study shows the wealthy 
people are also getting access to the PESP benefits which can be explained through 
Bourdieu’s battle of transformation and preservation of the field by the poor and wealthy 
families. It was found that the poor families lagged behind in the battle due to their attitude 
and practices and lost the benefit to the children of privileged family-background and thus 
rich families with symbolic and economic capital won the dominant positions in this new 
education field structure. According to Bourdieu, in highly unequal societies, two social 
agencies are responsible for inculcating cultural capital: the family and the school. The 
implicit system of rewarding good performing student is accorded in the school system 
(institutional habitus) and thus agreed institutional success give the non-poor children 
access to the PESP benefit. This transfer of the PESP resource to the non-target household 
can be explained by hysteresis effect, a structural lag between opportunities and 
dispositions in reproducing structures in habitus. People rich in social, economic, and 
cultural capital, first pursue the new position and working classes move to the position 
slowly (Bourdieu, 1986).  
Thus, the study shows an apparent conflict between educationally disadvantaged families, 
and the study school, regarding distribution and redistribution of the benefit, is common 
and sometimes, it takes the form of a severe beating of the poor low achieving and PESP 
receiving children. It seems from the study that the school and the parents’ groups failed to 
acknowledge the reality of poor PESP receiving children and shifting the benefit to the 
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wealthy student with a disparaging notion to them. Permanent placing of the poor PESP 
receiving children in the backbench is also a result of such a disparaging notion. This 
disparaging notion (habitus) is inclusive of class, family, and individual experience and 
governs behaviour through unconscious perception of “what is reasonable to expect” 
(Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). Allocating continuous backbench sitting position for 
poorer children is a form of “symbolic violence” against them practiced by the teachers out 
of such reasonable expectation (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). Thus, this study sharpens 
our understanding about how the PESP benefit transfers to the non-poor families without 
any conflict between poor and non-poor families using some key concepts of Pierre 
Bourdieu.   
7.6.2 Implication for future research  
To generalize and confirm findings of this case study and to explore the role of PESP on 
household poverty reduction, long-term case studies are needed. The long-term case study 
may provide longitudinal data from the participating households and children that help in 
exploring the effects of the PESP on children’s school participation and achievement over 
time. Parental perception and participation in education and its effects on children can also 
be explored from those long-term case studies. In addition, future research could explore:   
 Establishing relationships between the PESP and children’s performance; PESP and 
poverty; PESP and school completion, repetition and school leaving are crucial areas 
of investigation. A cross-sectional quantitative study, carried out with a fully 
representative sample, is imperative to establish those relationships.   
 An actual measure of student benefit including perception of the student about the 
benefit of the PESP in achieving quality education for poor children.  
 How an early school enrolment, in order to get access to the PESP money implicate 
high repetition rate owing to poor performance of the PESP receiving children. 
The effects of incongruent classroom on teaching-learning process and on student’s 
performance should also be examined using classroom observation technique to 
understand impact of the PESP on student’s learning.    
These studies could help in understanding how inequalities are reproduced and how the 
PESP deals with those adversities within the existing social field (education).  
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7.6.3 Personal reflection about my research journey 
If I look back into my journey in this research, it gives me a mottled and the meandering 
contour of a research issue selection, initially through developing research questions, 
taking a philosophical and methodological stance and analysing and writing this report. I 
had to shift and change my position frequently with the changes in my hypothetical 
position and suppositions as a researcher. The change in the social construction of 
equitable access to quality education due to the introduction of PESP was the main intent 
of my research in the very beginning. Later it was changed to focus on understanding the 
PESP participants and teachers and their views about the impact of the PESP in increasing 
equity in education and in the society at large. However, based on my supervisor’s 
suggestion, I reflected on my issue systematically and understood the expanse of my 
research that included concepts of access, equity, and quality that are understood by 
parents, teacher, and head teachers in relation to the PESP. Later, I narrowed down the 
scope of my study and focused on the strengths and weakness of the PESP in assessing its 
effects in ensuring quality education for the poor children. Here, I had to shift myself from 
understanding long-term social changes to perceptual and phenomenal changes 
experienced by the programme participants due to the introduction of the PESP. In this 
way, varied adjustments were wrought depending on added knowledge about 
methodology, theoretical implications of research approaches and standardized research 
procedures. Selection of a case study method and selection of case and programme 
participants also went through a modification and changed with my increasing theoretical 
knowledge of research methodology. Moreover, in all the stages, I always relied on my 
reflexivity to give me new perspectives, insights, and an analytical strategy to conduct this 
research. The present knowledge which has come out of this research thus is procedural 
knowledge generated from the context and interpreted with reflection.  
7.7 Contribution to knowledge  
This study was initiated to understand perceptions of the teacher, head teacher, and parents 
of the PESP receiving children regarding how they saw the effects of the PESP and what 
were its strengths and weaknesses in achieving quality education for the poor children. 
Most of the studies on the PESP and Food for Education programme in Bangladesh show 
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around half of the benefits being used by non-poor families. However, it was not clear how 
the non-poor families were included in the selection process and why other people were 
silent about this unfair distribution. This study show that in the first grade poor children are 
given the benefit but when conditionality is imposed in the upper grades, the poor children 
fail to meet the condition and the stipend goes to the non-poor families through their good 
performing children. The conditions play an important role to transfer the PESP benefit to 
the non-poor families and poor families had to accept the reality because of their children’s 
perceived ‘low ability’ to sustain the benefit and parent’s inability to spend more to 
compensate the ‘low ability’. This is an important contribution to knowledge about how 
the PESP benefit transfers to the non-poor families with the help of conditions and how it 
is accepted in the society without any conflict between poor and non-poor families.  
The second important contribution to knowledge is that the schoolteachers and the SMC 
want to spread the PESP benefit across the community to cover maximum families, even 
by breaking the existing rule to proffer two children the PESP benefit from a poor family if 
they study in the same school. This has happened partly due to the lack of understanding of 
the purpose of the PESP resource and partly because of the intensity of poverty in this area. 
This signifies the need for distribution of the PESP benefits based on the intensity of 
poverty in different parts of the country.     
The most important contribution is the insignificance of the PESP in ensuring quality 
education for the poor children. The teacher, head teacher, as well as parents, mention the 
negative effects of the PESP on classroom environment, teaching and learning processes, 
and classroom management as a whole. Some parents see the PESP as a major cause of 
their children’s estrangement with the school since they are unable to meet the competitive 
cost of private tutors that the school teachers recommend. It suggests that the school 
expects extra support from outside to ensure the quality of education for these PESP 
receiving poor children. This knowledge indicates the PESP money can attract some of the 
very poor children to the school, but it has the insignificant role in ensuring quality 
education for them.   
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Briefly, the PESP policy with its internecine problems, conditionality and undue influence 
of economic and symbolic capital, has failed to ensure quality education for poor children. 
However, the programme is used as a catchword for touting government’s generosity and 
commitment towards providing equal opportunity for poor children, but in reality, it is not 
working well. Lack of materials, teachers’ low expectations, lack of extra care in the 
classroom, and lack of compassion at home is alienating some poor PESP receiving 
children from the school, and the PESP resource shifts to the meritorious non-poor 
children. Thus, the PESP fails to ensure equitable access to quality education for poor 
PESP receiving children; rather it causes permanent social exclusion (WB, 2013) for some 
of these children and helps perpetuate social class system.  
It is an expectation that the PESP money attracts poor children into the school and the 
school provides them with a quality education but this study suggests that the relationship is 
not so simple. It is found that the lower achievement targets and low expectation of teachers 
de-motivates poor children to learn and give the teacher a strong excuse for not being 
accountable for their low performance. Thus, a societal perception of the poor children’s un-
educability is established and it undermines the self-esteem and ambitions of poor children. 
The situation deteriorates further as a result of the lower level parent-teacher relationship 
due to the PESP allocation and distribution related conflicts that often end up with 
punishment for these children in the classroom. The study shows perfunctory school 
participation and truancy is emerging among the children who want to show their 
attendance only to sustain the PESP and those who want to avoid punishment and 
humiliation in the classroom. The study also revealed that the PESP invites private tutoring 
and competition for spending and it otherwise decreases public expenditure on education. 
Normally, perception of inequity in education is seen from the demand side perspective; 
however, the role of school and school system for bringing equity in education remains 
undisclosed and unattended. Finally, the study reveals that none of the parents, teacher, or 
head teacher acknowledge that the PESP money help provide quality education for the poor 
children and all these findings challenge the underlying principle of the PESP in 
Bangladesh.  
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In brief, the study argues that the PESP in Bangladesh fails to improve quality of education 
for the PESP receiving children; rather it spells sufferings for some children from the part 
of families as well as school as they cannot fulfil required conditions for the PESP. The 
PESP also increases private tutoring, decreases parent-teacher relationship and creates an 
unwelcoming classroom environment for the PESP receiving children. Therefore, the 
PESP of Bangladesh faces a serious question of why this programme should be continued 
and how this huge amount of spending on education can be justified.  
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Annex 1 
Interview schedule with the teacher of a selected primary school in Bangladesh 
 
Access  
 What is the enrolment policy of your school? 
 What impact dose the PESP/policy has on enrolment process? 
 Do all the children of your school catchment area enrol in your school? 
 What happen to the rest if not all enrol in this school? 
 Who usually left out of the school? 
 Why do (some) children fail to enrol in the school, in spite of PESP benefit 
for them?    
 
Role of PESP in ensuring access to school resources (strengths and weaknesses) 
 Do all the children of your school get free new books? 
 Is there any relationship between getting PESP benefit and having old 
books? 
 Do all the children have their required learning materials? 
 Who usually lack the learning materials and why?   
 How does the PESP ensure learning materials for the poor children?   
 
Access to teachers in relation to PESP  
 What is the teacher student ratio in your school?  How PESP influence the 
ratio? 
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 Is there any policy to have additional teachers in accordance with 
concentration of more PESP receiving learners’ in the classroom? How it 
work? 
 Does PESP have any influence on seating arrangement of the children in the 
classroom? How it work?  
  Do you have strategy to pay special attention to the PESP holder learners 
for better performance? How it work? 
 
How PESP contribute to ensure quality education for poor children?  
 Does PESP policy have influence on quality education? How it influence?  
 Who are under the risk of low quality education from the school? Why?   
 Do all the children in the same class learn equally? What are the reasons for 
differences in achievement? 
 Who are the minimal achievers? Why? 
 
Policy formulation process  
 
 What is the goal and objectives of the PESP? 
 How long your school is implementing PESP? 
 How this PESP was initiated?  
 What was the process of design of this PESP? 
 Do you think it could be different if take opinion of the people before 
introduction of this PESP in the school? How?   
Conditions  
 What are the selection criteria for PESP beneficiary and how strictly were 
those imposed?  
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 What are the conditions of getting PESP benefits? 
 How the students and parents are made aware of the conditions related to the 
stipend? 
 Are girls given any preference for allocating PESP benefit? 
 How attendance and achievement records are verified, checked, and 
preserved? 
 What happen to the disqualified children? 
 What happen to the money deducted from the children who cannot fulfil the 
conditions 
 What was the community feeling about the conditions?  
 What are the impacts of these conditions  (enrolling children in different 
schools) 
 
Disbursement/ Implementation  
 What was the schedule and process for disbursement of the stipend money? 
 Whom the money was disbursed and how was it verified? 
 Why the money is given to mothers? What were the consequences of this 
condition?  
 How do the parents take part in PESP disbursement process?   
 
Advantages and disadvantages (impacts of PESP) 
 How helpful was PESP for ensuring child’s school participation (enrolment, 
attendance). How?  
 How helpful was the PESP for ensuring child’s quality education 
(achievements, grades, etc.). How?  
 Was the stipend money enough to meet all the cost of education of the 
children?   
 Do all illegible students get the PESP benefits? Who excluded, why?  
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 How can PESP be better functioning in ensuring equitable access to quality 
education for all children?  
 What are your suggestions for improving equitable access to basic education 
for all children? 
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Annex 2  
Interview schedule with the head teacher of a selected primary school in 
Bangladesh 
 
Access  
 What is the enrolment policy of your school?  
 How does it influenced by the PESP policy? 
 How does PESP help in ensuring all poor children’s school enrolment and 
achievement?   
 
How PESP influence the resource allocation process in the school? 
 New books allocation  
 Learning materials assurance   
 Classroom facility distribution  
 Teacher allocation (teacher student ratio) 
 
Ensuring quality education for all children   
 How PESP helps in ensuring quality education for all children?  
 Is there any differential achievement level for different groups of children? 
Who are achieving less from the school? Why? 
 Has the PESP something to do with this differential school performance?  
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Equity in relation to PESP   
 How PESP help in bringing about equity in primary school education?   
 If not, what are the reasons? What else can be done?  
 
PESP policy processes (policy formulation and implementation) 
 What is the goal and objectives of the PESP? 
 How do you implement the policy in your school? 
 How much time do the teachers spend in implementing PESP? 
 How do the community people perceive of the effects of PESP? Why? 
 How does the PESP influence school community relationship and how do 
you resolve the conflict, if any?  
 
Effects of PESP on Classroom culture  
 What are the effects of the PESP on classroom teaching and learning 
process? 
 How it influence classroom management and school operation as a whole?  
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Annex 3 
 Interview guide with the parent of primary school completed children with 
PESP (2 parents) 
 
Introduction  
 Family background 
 Settlement (permanent or migrated/in/out) 
 Family member, occupation, income, relative socioeconomic status  
 
About the child 
 Birth and infancy  of the child (health history, immunisation)   
 Adequate/inadequacy of attention (any types of physical or learning 
disabilities)  
 Schooling age (how the child was enrolled and by whom, enrolment 
process)  
 
Access in relation to PESP   
 Goal and objective of the PESP 
 Process of PESP involvement 
 Why the child was enrolled in this (study) school (expectation of the 
parents) 
 Has PESP anything to do with enrolling your child in this school? How/why 
not? 
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 Do all the children coming from all background get PESP benefit? Who get 
and why?  
 Do you think there is a relationship between having new books and getting 
PESP? How? 
 Do you think there is a relationship between PESP participation and getting 
teacher’s special attention in the classroom? Why and why not?   
 Is there any influence of PESP on seating arrangement of the children in the 
classroom? Why and how? Where did your child usually sit? Why? 
 
Quality in relation to PESP 
 Has this school provided expected quality education to your child? Why/ 
why not? 
 Is there any relationship between getting PESP money and getting quality 
education? How? If not, why?  
 Who do better in the classroom performance, PESP holder, or non-PESP 
holder learners? Why? 
 What are the ways of getting better quality education other than PESP? 
 
Conditions of PESP 
 What were the conditions of getting PESP benefits? 
 How the students and parents are made aware of the condition related to the 
stipend? 
 How do you see these conditions of PESP? Did your child consistently 
maintain the conditions? How? Why not? 
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Disbursement/ Implementation  
 What was the schedule and process for disbursement of the stipend money? 
 Whom the money was disbursed and how it was verified? 
 Why the money is given to mothers? What were the consequences of this 
condition?  
 What did you do with the money? (How money was spent?) 
 How much money did your child get as PES? Was it transparent?  
 
Effects of the PESP  
 Was the stipend money enough to meet all the cost of education? How much 
money you had to pay per month in addition to the PESP money? Why?  
 Do all illegible students get the PESP benefits? Who excluded, why?  
 What are your suggestions for improving quality of education for all 
children? 
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Annex 4  
Interview guide with the parent of school leaver children with PESP (2 
parents) 
 
Introduction  
 Family background 
 Settlement (permanent or migrated/in/out) 
 Family member, occupation, income, relative socioeconomic status  
 
About the child 
 Birth and infancy  of the child (health history, immunisation)   
 Adequate/inadequacy of attention (any types of physical or learning 
disabilities)  
 Schooling age (how the child was enrolled and by whom, enrolment 
process)  
 
Access to education    
 Why the child was enrolled in this (study) school (expectation of the 
parents) 
 What were the requirements for child’s enrolment (birth certificate, 
recommendations, catchment area, etc) 
 Do you face any type of reluctance from the school’s part in enrolling the 
child in this school? Why/why not and how it was overcome. (Regarding 
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age of the child, excessive enrolment pressure, merit of the child, or social 
class, etc) 
 Had PESP anything to do with enrolling your child in this school? How/why 
not?  
 If there was no PESP, would you enrol the child in the school? Why/why 
not? 
 Do you think there is a relationship between having new books and getting 
PESP benefit? How? 
 Has PESP anything to do with seating arrangement of the children in the 
classroom? Why and how? Where did your child usually sit? Why? 
 Was your child treated equally in the classroom? Why?  
 
Quality in relation to PESP 
 Is this school providing expected quality education for all the children? 
Why/ why not? 
 The children who get PESP money, are they all getting quality education? 
How? Who are/aren’t getting quality education? 
 What are the other means of getting better quality education other than 
PESP? 
 
School leavers related   
 Did your child get adequate teachers’ attention before school leaving? Why? 
Why not?  
 If your child did not get quality education, what was the point for continuing 
PESP for sometimes, or for such other children? 
 Do all the children with PESP money are getting equal benefit from the 
school?  
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 What are the reasons for getting differential benefits from the same school? 
 How all children can get equal benefits from the school irrespective of their 
background? Why it is important? 
 
Selection process of PESP participants  
 What is the goal and objectives of the PESP? 
 How many years did your child get PESP money before school leaving? 
 What were the selection criteria for PESP beneficiary? 
 How your child was selected for the benefit?   
 Do all the eligible poor children receive the stipend money? 
 
Conditions of PESP 
 What were the conditions of getting PESP benefits? 
 How the students and parents are made aware of the condition related to the 
PESP? 
 How do you see these conditions of PESP?  
 Did your child consistently maintain the conditions?  
 How many children were disqualified?  
 How your child was disqualified? 
 What happen to other disqualified children? 
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Disbursement/Implementation  
 What was the schedule and process for disbursement of the stipend money? 
 Whom the money was disbursed and how was it verified? 
 How much money did your child get as PES?  
 Did you get full amount of money for each tranche? 
 How transparent the process of determining deduction?  
 
Use of PESP money  
 What did you do with the money? (How money was spent?) 
 Was the amount adequate for your child’s education?  
 How much money you had to spend per month in addition to the PESP 
money? Why? 
 How often were you consulted and asked to use the money for your child’s 
education only?  Who told you that?  
 
School leaving process and PESP 
 What are the reasons for your child’s school leaving in spite of PESP 
involvement? Why PESP was unable to stop dropping out? 
 Was s/he becoming irregular in attending the school? 
 Was s/he repeated in the grade as a resultant?   
 Did your child become low achiever in the class? Why?  
 Was his/her school leaving something to do with the conditions of PESP?  
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Effect of the PESP on classroom culture 
 Where did your child usually seat in the classroom?  
 Did your child get extra care from the teacher? 
 What teachers expected from you to improve your child’s class 
performance? 
 What is teacher’s attitude towards your child’s educational progression?  
 
Effects of the PESP on parent teachers’ relationship  
 Do you think the relationship with the school/teachers has been affected due 
to the PESP? How?  
 What effect of this deteriorated relationship impacted on your child’s school 
performance?    
 
Suggestions for improvement of PESP  
 How can PESP be better functioning in ensuring equitable access to quality 
education for all children?  
 What are your suggestions for improving access to basic education for all 
children? 
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Annex 5  
Interview guide with the parent of low performing children (two parents) with 
PESP 
 
Introduction  
 Family background 
 Settlement (permanent or migrated/in/out) 
 Family member, education of family members 
 Occupation, income, relative socioeconomic status (qualitative information 
not amount/number) 
 
About the child 
 Birth of the child 
 Infant stages of the child (nimble, laggard,  talking age, etc) 
 Morbidity (health history) 
 Adequate/inadequacy of attention (any types of physical or learning 
disabilities)  
 Schooling age (how the child was enrolled and by whom, enrolment 
process)  
 
Access and PESP   
 Why the child was enrolled in the school (expectation of the parents) 
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 Do they face any type of reluctance from the school’s part in enrolling the 
child? If yes, what types of grudging? How this restiveness was resolved? 
(enrolment history) 
 How much were you encouraged by PESP money in enrolling your child? 
 Have the child offered new or old books? What was the impact of old book 
on students’ morality? 
 Does the child have adequate learning materials?  How does it influence 
child’s school participation? 
 Where do your child seat in the class, (first bench, last bench), why? 
 Is your child treated equally in the classroom? If not, what were the reasons?  
 Does the child have equal teachers’ attention? Why is this differential 
treatment?  
 Does economic and social status have influence on teacher’s behaviour?  
 
PESP and Quality of education   
 Why did the parent choose this school for his/her your child? 
 Is this school providing expected quality education to your child? The 
reasons for maintaining and not maintaining expected quality.   
 Do all the children from all background participate in school equally? 
 Do all the children get equal benefit from the school? 
 
Low achievement  
 Does your child learn equally in the school?   
 How wide is the range of differences in achievement?  
 What are the reasons for these differences in achievement? 
 Do all the PESP receiving children remain such low achiever? Why? Why 
not?  
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 What is the impact of this very low achievement of your child on further 
education and on his/her life?  
Primary Education Stipend Project 
 What was the goal and objectives of the PESP? 
 What are the selection criteria of PESP benefit?  
 How your child was selected for the benefit?  
 Do all illegible students were selected? Are they all receiving the stipend 
money? Why not? 
 Who are presently getting this benefit?  
 
Conditions of PESP 
 What are the conditions of continuing PESP benefit? 
 How the students and parents are made aware of the conditions related to the 
stipend? 
 Could your child fulfil the conditions of PESP? 
 Do you think these conditions are necessary? Why? Why not? 
 What proportions of children usually are disqualified?  Who decide who will 
be disqualified? 
 Are these conditions helping in archiving expected goals of PESP?  
 Are girls given any preference? 
 
Disbursement of the money  
 What is the schedule and process for disbursement of the stipend money? 
 Whom is money disbursed to and how is it verified? 
 Why the money is given to mothers? 
 What do you do with the money? (How money is spent?) 
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 How much money does your child get as PES? Is the process of 
disbursement transparent?  
 Is the stipend amount adequate to meet the cost of education of your child? 
 
Impact of PESP on learning  
 How your child is doing in the school in terms of achievement?  
 Why does your child become low achiever in the classroom? How?  
 Does s/he enjoy the school activities? How do you understand that?   
 As an under achiever, is s/he becomes irregular attendee?  
 Is s/he becomes at the risk of grade repeater or already repeated?  
 Why the PESP money fails to ensure better learning for your child?   
 How has it affected the overall learning situation of the school?  
 Is PESP creating a differential effect on child performance from different 
background?  
 What can make your child’s education more effective and role the PESP can 
play in this regard? 
 
Impact of PESP  
 How has it affected the overall learning situation of the school?  
 How can PESP be better functioning in ensuring equitable access to quality 
education for all children? (What are your suggestions for improving 
equitable access to basic education for all children?) 
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Annex 6 
Interview number  
1. Mother of a dropout boy 
2. Mother of a school completed girl 
3. Mother of a school completed boy  
4. Mother of a low achiever girl 
5. Mother of a dropout boy  
6. Mother of a low achiever girl   
7. A teacher of the study school  
8. The head teacher of the study school  
 
 
